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INTRODUCTION

D

ear Prospective Surgeon: There are some questions I need to ask
you before I can accept you as my surgeon.
Have you been sexually active since 1977?
If so, with how many different partners?
For male surgeons, are you sexually active with men, women or both?
For female surgeons, might one or more of your sexual partners (sic) been
at risk for HIV infection or hepatitis B?
Have you had an HIV test? What is the result?
Have your sexual partners had an HIV test?
Have you had hepatitis B? Have you been tested?
Have you ever transmitted hepatitis B to a patient?
How much alcohol do you drink during the week?
Have you ever been told that you had a problem with alcohol?
Do you smoke?
If so, do you ever crave tobacco during long operations?
Do you take any drugs? If so, what are they?
For female surgeons, do you have PMS?
Does it ever bother you when you operate?
Have you had a recent major illness or death in your family?
Have you had problems with your memory or concentration?
Have you been depressed lately?
Have you had problems with coordination?
How many of your patients have died during or within a week of surgery?
If you needed surgery, which surgeon would you consult?
Could you please refer me to that surgeon?'

Dear Patient: Are you afraid? What of? Why?
Kimberly Bergalis, an attractive, eighteen year old Florida woman,
apparently contracted the HIV virus from her dentist, Dr. David Acer.
Pictures and stories splashed across the popular media detailed Ms. Bergalis' anger and anguish as she slowly died of AIDS. Ms. Bergalis' tragedy and that of four other patients whom Dr. Acer may have infected
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, OPEN MEETING ON THE RISKS OF TRANSMISSION OF
BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS TO PATIENTS DURING INVASIVE PROCEDURES 84,85 (1991) (statement

of Dr. Neil Schram, American Association of Physicians for Human Rights) [hereinafter CDC
OPEN MEETING].
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have produced calls to restrict the practices of health care workers infected with the AIDS virus.2
Americans are afraid. They worry that their doctors, dentists, and
nurses may infect them with AIDS. Sixty percent of Americans believe
that surgeons and dentists infected with the AIDS virus should be prohibited from practicing.' A staggering fifty percent believe that all physicians and other health care workers with the AIDS virus should be
barred entirely from giving any patient care.4
This fear has taken its toll on medical professionals. HIV infected
physicians, nurses and other health care workers have lost their jobs,
watched their practices evaporate, and have had their duties restricted
when patients and employers learned about their infection.5 A Texas pediatrician lost almost all of his patients after a newspaper story revealed
his HIV positive status. 6 Some medical schools and residency programs
have attempted to terminate the training of students and graduates with
HIV infection.7 Even health care workers who do not have AIDS suffer
discrimination because the public assumes that they are likely to be infected: homosexuals, former intravenous drug users, anyone who falsely
2. See infra notes 3-4.
3. Barbara Kantrowitz, Doctors with AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49, 54. Kantrowitz
notes that sixty-three percent of Americans believe that surgeons infected with the AIDS virus
should be prohibited from practicing, while sixty percent believe infected dentists should be forbidden from practicing. Id.
For this poll, the Gallup Organization interviewed a representative national sample of 618 adults
by telephone on June 20, 1991. Id. The margin of error was plus or minus five percentage points.
Id. at 51.
4. Id. at 54. Sixty-five percent of those polled would discontinue all treatment, both invasive
and non-invasive, from a physician, dentist or other health care worker if they learned that the
worker was infected with the AIDS virus. Id. Fifteen percent would continue treatment with stringent protective measures. Thirteen percent would continue treatment but exclude surgery or other
invasive procedures. Id. at 52.
An overwhelming ninety-four percent of those polled believed that an HIV-infected physician or
dentist should be required to disclose his or her infection to patients. Ninety-five percent believe that
surgeons should be required to inform their patients while ninety percent believe that all health-care
workers should be required to disclose. Id. at 51.
5. See generally Mike Williams, 'It brought it right to our back door" Dentist Who SpreadAIDS
Infected Fla. Town with Distrust,ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 31, 1991, at 1 (discussing the reaction
of dentists in the wake of Kimberly Bergalis' contraction of the AIDS virus); Doe v. New York
Hosp., No. GA-00035041487-DN (N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights Oct. 3, 1988); Doe v.
Montefiore Medical Ctr., No. 9K-E-D-88-132299 (N.Y. State Div. Human Rights, Sept. 7, 1989);
Leckelt v. Hospital Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (a nurse at a Louisiana hospital, whose
homosexual lover died of AIDS, was fired when he refused to submit the results of an HIV test).
6. Peter Applebome, Doctorin Texas With AIDS Virus Closes His PracticeAmid a Furor,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1987, at B8.
7. See Doe v. Washington Univ., No. 88-2509-C-4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 1988).
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tests positive for HIV, racial and ethnic minorities, and anyone who lives
with, cares for, or cares about a person with AIDS.'
This fear threatens to drive public policy. It leaves us with several
fundamental questions: Should we permit surgeons, doctors and nurses
with AIDS to practice? What risk do they pose to patients? How much
risk is too much risk?
This Article addresses these questions by examining two federal discrimination statutes which define how much risk is too much risk and
when some risk is acceptable:9 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
197310 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1 Section 504
prohibits discrimination against people with handicaps in federally
funded programs. 2 The ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in a broad array of settings including private employment 13 and
public accommodations, including private physicians' offices. 14
Section 504 and the ADA demand that society look beyond labels,
stigmas and fears to the actual risk of contagion. Under both statutes,
AIDS infected persons are considered "individuals with disabilities";" as
such, they enjoy statutory protection as long as they do not pose a "significant risk" to others. Thus, the issue is: Do health care workers infected with the HIV virus pose a significant risk to others?
Much of the discrimination against health care workers, like that
against all people with AIDS, reflects prejudice, fear and misinformation.
Therefore, this Article begins by attempting to replace the myths about
AIDS and its transmission with medical facts. Part I of this Article dis8. THE CITY OF N. Y. COMM'N ON HuMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH AIDS AND PEOPLE PERCEIVED TO HAVE AIDS 3 (June, 1987).
9. See infra Part 11A (1) and (2).
10. 29 U.S.C.A § 794 (West Supp. 1992).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, et seq. (West Supp. 1992).
12. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1992). Section 504 provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section
706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation

in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.

13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(f) (West Supp. 1992). The employment provisions went into effect
July 26, 1992 for employers with twenty-five or more workers, and will go into effect on July 26,
1994 for employers with fifteen or more workers. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (5)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (West Supp. 1992).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12201(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992); 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1992); 42

U.S.C.A.

§ 12102(b) (West Supp. 1992). The Rehabilitation Act uses the term "individual with

handicaps." 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1992). The ADA refers to an "individual with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Handicap and disability are meant to have
the same meaning under the two acts. See infra notes 160-61.

1992]

ELIMINATING FEAR

cusses the cause of the disease, its progression and its treatment. It explains how the disease is transmitted, focusing primarily on the risk of
transmission from health care workers to patients.
Part II addresses three issues. It begins by setting out the general
framework of Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). It then examines Section 504 and the ADA's prohibition on
discrimination against those with contagious diseases, and in particular,
people with HIV disease. Part II also explores the primary limitation on
the two acts' protection of persons with contagious diseases-the limitation to those who pose no significant risk to others. In deciding if a risk
is significant, the acts demand that courts balance two protective goals:
the need to protect persons disabled by a contagious disease from irrational prejudice and the need to protect third parties from unreasonable
risk of contagion.
Part III examines the difficulties courts have encountered in applying the "significant risk" standard in individual cases. Courts and commentators unanimously agree that the standard requires that any risk
must be significant, not merely a theoretical or potential risk.16 Nonetheless, courts have had difficulty drawing these distinctions.17 This difficulty will continue because courts have not yet recognized the need to
establish criteria for measuring risk. This Article exposes the inherent
impossibility of quantifying "significant risk" without an acceptable
baseline.
Part III proposes that the best way to measure significant risk is
through a comparative risk approach. No environment is risk free. To
determine if a risk is tolerable, it must be compared to other risks that
are tolerated in the same or similar settings. If the risk posed by a person
with a contagious disease is no greater than similar risks that are tolerated in the setting, then the person does not pose a significant risk.
Part IV applies this comparative risk analysis to health care workers
with HIV. It compares the risk of transmitting HIV with other patient
risks that are tolerated in hospitals and other health care settings, particularly the risk of hepatitis transmission. The Article concludes that in
many, and probably most, situations, the risk of AIDS transmission is
insignificant when compared with many other risks to patients from
medical treatment and medical personnel. However, in every case courts
should conduct an individualized inquiry into the worker's current
16. See infra text accompanying notes 210-16.
17. See infra text accompanying note 233.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

health, job duties, job performance, and infection control record. Courts
should quantify the risks posed by an individual worker and compare
them to other patient risks tolerated in the health care setting. Courts
should conclude that a worker poses a significant risk to patients only if
the risk is demonstrably greater than other risks which are normally
tolerated.
The rush to banish health care workers with HIV infection from
practice is not based on a medically enlightened understanding of the
risks these workers pose to others. Rather, the public and our courts are
propelled by the very fear and prejudice that Section 504 and the ADA
are designed to guard against."' The AIDS epidemic offers a twentieth
century glimpse at our reflexive reactions to a contagious disease that
first struck a feared and devalued minority, homosexuals. Section 504
and the ADA provide a framework for replacing the fear and prejudice
with facts and a balanced analysis. They protect society without excluding those whom Congress has protected: individuals with AIDS who do
not significantly threaten others. A comparative risk analysis assures
that courts will not only identify and quantify the available data on the
risk of transmission, but that they will do so faithful to the goal of disability discrimination statutes that do not require the removal of all possible risks. Even if a worker presents some risk, it is significant only if
comparable risks are not tolerated.
I.
A.

AIDS: THE DISEASE AND ITS TRANSMISSION

The Disease

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first identified
in the early 1980's.19 As of February 30, 1991, 167,803 cases of AIDS
20
had been reported in the United States and 106,361 people had died.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. II, 22-26, (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N., 303-04, 308.
19. The first five cases of what was to become known as AIDS were reported by the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) on June 5, 1981. See Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia
Among Homosexual Men-New York City and California, 30 MoRBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 305, 305-06 (1981). However, some experts conclude that AIDS is an old, if not ancient,

disease that merely became epidemic in the 1980s. See Harold P. Katner & George A. Pankey,
Evidencefor a Euro-American Originof Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 79 J. NAT'L. MED.
ASS'N. 1068 (1987).
For a compelling description of the human side of the identification and initial spread of the
disease, see RANDY SHuTs, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987).
20. CENTERs FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, 5, 13 (1991)
[hereinafter SURVEILLANCE REPORT]. The CDC's surveillance case definition for AIDS has been
criticized as being too narrow, thus causing under-reporting of AIDS cases. In August 1987, the
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The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimate that by 1993 the total
number of AIDS cases in the United States will reach between 390,000
and 480,000, and the number of AIDS related deaths will total 285,000
to 340,000.21 Estimates indicate that about 1 million Americans are currently infected with the HIV virus.2 Slightly less than one percent of the
working age population is HIV positive, 23 and the percentage of health
care workers who are infected is similar.24 As of July 1991, 6,436 cases
CDC definition was expanded in two ways: first to include additional AIDS-indicator diseases, e.g.
HIV dementia, wasting syndrome, extrapulmonary tuberculosis; and second, to accept presumptive
diagnoses of some other indicator diseases--e.g., pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, esophageal candidiasis-when tests for HIV infection are positive. See Update.:Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Associated with Intravenous-DrugUse- UnitedStates; 1988, 38 MoRwiDrrY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 165, 166, 168 (1989). The CDC's present definition is being challenged
on the grounds that it ignores indicator diseases found in women, but not men and therefore results
in under-reporting of women with AIDS. See generally Carola Marte & Kathryn Anaslos, Women The Missing Persons in the AIDS Epidemic, Pt. I, 19 HEALTHPAc No. 1 (1989).
As of March 1991, fifty-nine percent of all AIDS cases among adults and adolescents were homosexual and bisexual men, twenty-two percent were IV drug users, seven percent were both IV drug
users and homosexual men, one percent were hemophilia cases; five percent involved heterosexual
contact; two percent were transfusion recipients, and four percent were in the "other or undetermined" category. SuRVEILLANCE REPORT, supra. The "other" category included three health care
workers who seroconverted and later developed AIDS after occupational exposure to HIV-infected
blood. Thus, health care occupational exposure apparently accounts for only .0018% of the total
cases of AIDS.
Fifty-five percent of the people who died from AIDS were white, 27.9% were black, and 15.8%
were hispanic. Ninety percent were men, and ten percent were women. See id. at 10.
21. Estimates of HIVand PrevalenceandProjectedAIDS Cases"Summary ofa Workshop, October 31 - November ) 1989, 39 MoRB DrrY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 110, 117 (1990) [hereinafter
Estimates]. It is estimated that only eighty percent of all diagnosed AIDS cases are reported to the
CDC. Id, Thus, the CDC's projections are adjusted for unreported diagnoses of AIDS by adding
eighteen percent to projections based on reported cases.
22. Id. at 111. The CDC's most recent estimate of HiV prevalence is lower than their 1986
estimate of I million to 1.5 million infections because the earlier estimate was based on more limited
information. Id. at 110. Current statistical estimates of lIV infection range from 650,000 to 1.4
million, with data being most consistent with estimates between 800,000 and 1.2 million. Id. All of
these estimates are adjusted for previous deaths, under-reporting of AIDS cases, and the non-reporting of AIDS cases that do not fit the CDC's AIDS surveillance definition. Id, at 111.
23. AIDS andHuman Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the UnitedStates 1988 Update, 38
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Supp. 4 1989) [hereinafter Virus Infection]. The CDC's
working estimate of approximately one million infected Americans corresponds to a 0.4% infection
rate for the general population. However, since most HIV infected people are between seventeen and
fifty-five years of age, an age span that constitutes fifty-five percent of the population and roughly
corresponds to the age of most American workers, the infection rate in this population is estimated
to be at 0.7%. Since men are four times more likely than women to be infected, the rate of infection
is estimated to be 1.2% for men seventeen to fifty-four and 0.3% for women.
24. See OSHA Final Rule, Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 FED. REG.
64,004 (1989) [hereinafter OSHA]. Occupational information is available on only the 61,929 people
who have reported HIV infection. Of these, 5.1% are health care workers, a proportion similar to
the proportion of the labor force employed in the health care industry. See also PreliminaryAnaly-
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of health care workers with AIDS have been reported in the United
States, including 1,356 nurses, 1,101 health aids, 703 non-surgeon physicians, 171 dentists and hygienists, and 47 surgeons.25
AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV27
1).26 HIV belongs to a group of viruses known as human retroviruses.
The presence of the HIV virus does not automatically or immediately
cause illness. Rather, the virus gradually depletes the number of T-Lymphocyte helper (') cells in the body. 28 Since these T-cells are essential
for the functioning of portions of the body's immune system, the virus
renders the infected person increasingly susceptible to opportunistic
infections.2 9
The time between initial infection with the HIV virus and develop-0
3
ment of AIDS ranges from a few months to more than ten years.
sis: HIVSerosurvey of OrthopedicSurgeons, 40 MORBIDIT= & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 309, 310
(1991) (noting that of 3,420 orthopedic surgeons tested, only two were HIV seropositive, an infection
rate of 0.06%). However, rates of infection vary geographically, with some states and localities
having a much higher infection rate than others. See Virus Infection, supra note 23, at 2.
25. Kantrowitz, supra note 3, at 50 (citing CDC Data as of Mar. 31, 1991). The 6,436 cases
break down as follows: 1,356 nurses, 1,101 health aids, 941 technicians, 703 physicians, 116
paramedics, 319 therapists, 171 dentists and hygienists, 47 surgeons, 1,680 miscellaneous health
workers (social workers, administrators, etc.).
26. Revision of the CDC Surveillance Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36
MoRitDrry & MORTALrry Wiu.Y. REP. 1S, 6S (1987) [hereinafter Revised Definition]. There is
also a human nimmunodeficiency virus type 2 (HIV-2), which is epidemic in West Africa and which
has been linked with AIDS. MANDELL'S INFECTIous DISEAsES 1040 (1990). In this Article HIV
refers to HIV-1.
27. Revised Definition, supra note 26, at 25; Peter 3. Nanula, Protecting Confidentiality in the
Effort to Control AIDS, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGfs. 315, 321 (1987).
28. Nanula, supra note 27, at 321.
29. Ia
30. I ; Revised Definition, supra note 26, at 35. The stages of HIV disease used to be referred
to as asymptomatic infection, AIDS Related Complex (ARC) and full-blown AIDS. As more has
been discovered about the disease, these terms have been replaced by a four stage classification system based on the signs and symptoms of the infection.
Group I includes people who show signs of recent infection and who have antibodies to the HIV
virus. Within a month after exposure, many individuals experience a mononucleosis-like acute retroviral syndrome, which is usually self-limiting and followed or accompanied by the development of
antibodies. ClassificationSystem for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/LymphadenopathyAssociated Virus Infections, 35 MORBID=TY & MORTALrIy WKLY. RE . 334, 335-36 (1986) [hereinafter Classification System].
Group II includes people who have been infected with the virus for some time, but who are
outwardly asymptomatic. People classified in Group II may have normal blood counts or their
immune cells may be below normal levels because of the action of the HIV virus. Id. at 336. HIV
infected people classified as Group I and II appear healthy and are able to work and maintain a
normal or nearly normal daily schedule. Id
Group III includes people who have a persistent, generalized lymph node enlargement that lasts
more than three months, but who evidence no other outward signs or symptoms. Id. Group IV
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Although people can live for years without any sign of illness, most and
possibly all people infected with the virus will eventually develop symptoms.3 1 AIDS has no known cure; it is primarily managed by treating its
outward symptoms, such as wasting, opportunistic infections and dementia. Treatment, however, cannot reverse the immunodeficiency. 32 Once
the disease progresses to full-blown AIDS, the infected person generally
has less than twenty months to live.33
includes people with varying outward symptoms of the disease; these people are described as having
AIDS. Symptoms include wasting syndrome; dementia and other neurologic diseases; opportunistic
infectious diseases such as pneumocystic carinii pneumonia, fungal diseases such as oral candidiasis
(thrush), viral infections such as cytomegalovirus which can cause blindness, chronic or widespread
herpes simplex; bacterial infections such as zymycobaceruium avium complex; or certain forms of
cancer such as Kaposi's sarcoma, a skin cancer. Revised Definition, supra note 26, at 45; Classification System, supra. Many people in Group III and even some of those in the early stages of Group
IV are still able to work.
The disease does not necessarily progress through each of these four stages. Some people never
experience the initial mononucleosis-like symptoms. Id. at 336. Others go directly from being outwardly asymptomatic to having a life-threatening opportunistic infection, without going through any
intermediate stages. Kenneth H. Mayer, NaturalHistory and Current Therapy, in AIDS AND THE
LAW 22 (Larry Gostin ed., 1988).
31. See Classification System, supra note 30, at 335-36; see Letters, 264 JAMA 3147, 3147-48
(1990). In one study of gays, 48% developed AIDS within ten years after infection although additional AIDS cases are expected among those who have remained AIDS-free for more than ten years.
AIDS and HIV Infection in The STD GeneralPopulation, 38 MoRmiurry & MORTALrrY WKI.Y.
REP. 1 (Supp. 8 1989). Recent studies indicate that the length of time of infection is the major
independent predictor of whether a person will develop an opportunistic infection. Id.
32. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1981-88, 261 JAMA 2609
(1989). Zidovudine (formerly called AZT) is the only antiviral drug that has been approved by the
FDA specifically for the treatment of AIDS patients. Paul A. Volberding et al., Zidovudine in
Asymptomatic Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 941 (1990).
Zidovudine delays the development of full-blown AIDS in HIV-infected persons who are asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic, but who have reduced immune cell counts, and has greatly extended the
working careers of many HIV infected people. However, the drug can cause severe side effects,
usually anemias and cytopenias, which require careful and constant monitoring. See David K. Henderson & Julie L. Gerberding, Prophylactic Zidovudine after OccupationalExposure to the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: An Interim Analysis, 160 J. INFECTIous DISEASES 321, 322-23 (1989); see
also 1989 Sexually Transmitted Disease Treatment Guidelines, 38 MORnlDrrY & MORTALITY
WKLY. RaP. 1 (Supp. 8 1989); see also Volberding et al., supra, 948 n.34 (noting that Zidovudine is
prescribed for patients who have less than 500 CD4+ cells/cu.ml). Studies are also underway to
ascertain whether short term treatment with Zidovudine will prevent infection if administered immediately after possible exposure to the HIV virus. The initial studies are inconclusive because at least
three people have become infected despite immediate Zidovudine treatment. Nevertheless, many
individuals and at least one institution-the National Institute of Health-have decided to treat
workers with AZT after a significant occupational exposure to HIV-contaminated fluids. Henderson, supra, at 324-25; Volberding et al., supra, 948 n.34; Brady L. Allen, Correspondence,323 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 755 (1990); John D. Hamilton et al., Correspondence, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 754,
754-55 (1990) (suggesting that ambivalent test results due to statistical variables call results into
question).
33. Howard J. Anderson, OutpatientAIDS CareSqueezed by High Costs, Low Payments, Hosp.
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The commonly used tests for HIV infection-the Enzyme-Linked
Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test and the Western Blot test 34---cannot detect everyone who is HIV infected and thus capable of transmitting
the virus. These tests detect the presence of antibodies to the virus, not

the virus itself. Since antibody formation lags behind the contraction of
3
the virus, the tests cannot detect those recently infected with HIV. 1
40, 42 (May 5, 1991); Fred J. Hellinger, UpdatedForecastsof the Costs ofMedical Carefor Persons
with AIDS, 1989-93, 105 PuB. HEALTii REP. 1, 13 (1990). This information is only relevant to the
life expectancy of a person with AIDS in the United States.
34. The most commonly used test is the Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test.
Mark A. Rothstein, Screening Workers for AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 130 (Scott Burris ed.,
1987). The ELISA test exposes HIV antigens, substances that produce antibodies, to the blood being
tested. Any HIV antibodies present in the blood attach to the test HIW. Next, a second antibody
that attaches to human antibodies is introduced. This second antibody is bound to an enzyme that
produces a color, the intensity of which is proportional to the amount of human antibody binding to
the HIV antigens. The amount of the color is measured and compared with known positive and
negative controls to determine the existence of HIV antibodies and the amount of antibodies in the
blood. Id.
Since fifty to sixty percent of the positive responses to an ELISA test can be false, the Centers for
Disease Control recommend that no positive results be reported until the initial positive ELISA test
is confirmed by a second positive ELISA test as well as a more sensitive test like the Western Blot.
See id. at 130, 131-34 (when the ELISA test is used on the general population, which has an infected
rate of only about 1%, the positive predictive value of the ELISA test is less than 50%. This means
that for every person correctly detected to have the antibodies, one person will be incorrectly identified as positive); Serologic TestingforAntibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. RrP. 833, 845 (1988) [hereinafter Serologic Testing].
The Western Blot test identifies antibodies to proteins of a specific molecular weight and therefore
helps to eliminate false positives. The HIV antigens are separated by electrophoresis (heating) and
then blotted onto a special paper. The transferred antigens are then exposed to test serum and any
specific antibodies present react with the specific antigen bands. Rothstein, supra, at 130. For a
more detailed explanation of the operation of the Western Blot and criteria for interpreting a positive
result, see Interpretationand Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human Immu.
nodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infections, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2-4 (Supp. 7
1989) [hereinafter Western Blot].
For donated blood, where there is more concern about the safety of the blood than the number of
false positives, blood that reacts positive on the ELISA test is discarded. See Serologic Testing,
supra, at 845. The Western Blot results are used to determine how the patient should be notified and
counseled. See Western Blot, supra, at 4-5 (discussing the method and manner in which health care
providers are to inform patients of results).
The FDA has approved a new test for H1V antibodies that can be performed in only five minutes
and does not require sophisticated equipment. The new test, Recombigen HIV-1 Latex Agglutination, uses an engineered protein and microscopic beads to detect antibodies to HIV. Five-Minute
AIDS Test Is Approved by FDA, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1988, at A21. The accuracy of such tests and
the quality of the laboratories using them remain problematic. See Barry R. Furrow, AIDS and the
Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary HIV Testing, 34 VILL. L. Rav. 823, 839. See
also Gerald Schochetman, et al., Polymerase Chain Reaction, 158 J. INFECTIous DISEASES 1154,
1156 (1988) (noting that the five minute test may be too sensitive, causing an increase in false positives; the test must be used with strict laboratory controls).
35. AIDS and HIV Infection in The General STD Setting, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY

1992]

ELIMINATING FEAR

Neither can they detect persons whose immune systems are so severely
damaged by the HIV virus that they are incapable of producing antibodies. 6 Further, even though the tests are highly accurate when performed in sequence and under optimal conditions,3 7 false positives can
still result from contamination, technician error, or confounding medical
conditions.3 8 Finally, neither antibody test detects present or future
symptoms, or predicts when symptoms will develop.
WKLY. REP. 1 (Supp. 8 1989); Quality Aids Testing: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Regulation
and Business Opportunitiesof the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(statement and responses by Dr. Miike, Federal Office of Technology Assessment on the reliability of
blood tests done at private laboratories for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)) (the
joint false negative rate has been estimated at between five and eighty cases per 100,000) [hereinafter
Quality AIDS Testing]. Antibodies generally develop six weeks to three months following transmission of the virus; however, in some cases antibodies do not develop until a year or more after transmission. INsTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:

UPDATE 1988 (1989); James W. Curran et al., The Epidemiology of Aids: CurrentStatus andFuture
Prospects,229 SCIENCE 1352, 1354 (1985) (median interval from transmission to diagnosis is twentynine months for adults).
Because detectable antibodies usually develop three months after infection, it is recommended
that testing be done three and six months after known exposure. AIDS and HIV Infection in the
GeneralSTD Setting, 38 MoRmDrrY & MORTALrrY WKLY. UPDATE 1 (Supp. 8 1989).
36. Rothstein, supra note 34, at 131-33; Quality Aids Testing, supra note 35.
37. Michael J. Barry et al., Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits and the Burden of
Proof, 14 LAw, MED. AND HEALTH CARE, 259, 261 (1986) (commenting that the sensitivity and
specificity of a typical series of ELISA tests has been estimated by manufacturers to be as high as
99.6%); Donald S. Burke et al., Measurementof the False Positive Rate in a ScreeningProgramfor
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961, 962-63 (1988) (noting that
a series of ELISA tests followed by a Western Blot test are estimated to have a joint false positive
rate of less than I in 135,187); Michael D. Hagen et al., Routine Pre-operative Screeningfor HIV
Infection: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA 1357, 1358
(1988).
See Quality Aids Testing supra note 35; see generallyPaul D. Cleary et al., CompulsoryPremarital Screeningfor the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 JAMA 1757 (1988) (noting that sensitivity and specificity of the Western Blot among persons with EIA positive results are ninety-two
percent and ninety-five percent, respectively).
38. Rothstein, supra note 34, at 131; P.P. Mortimer, Which Anti-HTLV II/LAV Assays for
Screening and Confirmatory Testing? II LANCET 873, 875-76 (1985); Council on Scientific Affairs,
Status Report on the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus
Type III Testing, 254 JAMA 1342 (1985).
Testing quality in private commercial laboratories varies greatly because no national standards
exist. Furrow, supra note 34, at 839-41. A United States Army study of nineteen laboratories
judged ten to be substandard in that they could not obtain a ninety-percent accuracy level when
analyzing blood samples for HIV antibodies. The Army has since limited its HIV testing laboratories to a restricted number of carefully screened labs. Furrow, supra, at 838. Another study found a
false positive rate in Western Blot tests to be as high as 6.6%---one in fifteen. Donald S. Burke &
Robert R. Redfield, Letter to the Editor,False-Positive Western Blot Tests for Antibodies to HTL VIII, 256 JAMA 347 (1986). Between 3.9% and 4.1% of laboratories participating in the CDC's
Model Performance Evaluation Program heat-inactivated blood specimens before testing for HIV, a
practice used that can give false positive results on both the ELISA and the Western Blot tests.
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The costs to administer the HIV tests to all health care employees,
should we decide to do so, would be staggering. While the ELISA test is
relatively inexpensive-costing between two and three dollars to administer--the Western Blot costs about one hundred dollars per test. 4°
Given the positive infection rate of health care workers-about one percent-the cost of identifying one health care worker carrying the AIDS
virus via mass screening would be approximately $10,000.41
Thus, available tests cannot identify all the workers who are HIV
infected and, even if such a test were available, the costs to administer it
to all health care workers would be prohibitive. Meanwhile, estimates
are that from 64,360 to 643,600 American health care workers are HIV
infected. Many, if not most, of these workers are asymptomatic; they are
physically and mentally able to care for and are caring for patients. The
next section will explore the nature of the risk of HIV transmission from
worker to patient.
B. HIV Transmissionfrom Health Care Worker to Patient
AIDS is not easily transmitted. The HIV virus has not been transmitted through close, non-sexual contact like talking, holding hands or
hugging, or by sharing food, eating utensils, plates, drinking glasses, towels, or bathroom facilities, or by kissing on the cheeks and lips.42 Neither
has the virus been transmitted through intimate personal care activities
like bathing, massaging, cleaning non-bloody urine and feces,43 nor by
exposure of open wounds to saliva, from mouth to mouth resuscitation,
or by surgical procedures that involve direct exposure to saliva only. 44
Problems Createdby Heat-Inactivationof Serum Specimens Before HIB-1 Antibody Testing, 38 MORBIDrry & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 407, 408 (1989).
39. Carol Levine & Ronald Bayer, Screening Blood: Public Health and Medical Uncertainty,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., SPECIAL SupP. 8, 9 (1985).
40. Levine & Bayer, supra note 39, at 9.
41. Nancy Perkins, Comment, Prohibitingthe Use of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Test by Employers andInsurers, 25 HARV. 3. ON LEGIS. 275, 284 (1988) (noting that at a 10%
positive rate it costs $1,000 to identify a single HIV infected person; at five percent it costs $2,000;
and at one percent, the infection rate of the general population, it costs $10,000).
42. Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, 317 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1132, Tbls I, II (1987).
43. Id. at 1132; see also Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings, 36 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 2S (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter 1987
Recommendations].
44. Larry Gostin, Hospitals,Health CareProfessionalsandAIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 12 (1989); see
generally Julie Gerberding, Risk of Transmitting the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Cytomegalovirus, and Hepatitis B Virus to Health Care Workers Exposed and Patients with AIDS and
AIDS-Related Conditions, 156 J. INFEcTIous DIsaSEs 1, 6 (1987).
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Only human blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk appear to be capable of transmitting the virus.4' The only documented
modes of HIV transmission are: (1) sexual intercourse with an HIV infected person;' (2) sharing needles contaminated with blood infected
with the virus;4 7 (3) parenteral, 4 8 mucous membrane4 9 or non-intact skin
contact with HIV-infected blood; (4) transfusion of HIV-infected
blood;5" (5) mother to child transmission during pregnancy, delivery and
breast feeding; ' and (6) transplants of HIV infected organs and tissues.5 2
Health care workers place patients at risk of HIV transmission when
their blood contacts a cut or break in the patient's skin, or the mucous
membrane of the patient's eyes or mouth. Risk of HIV transmission also
occurs when a needle or other sharp instrument contaminated with a
worker's blood punctures a patient's skin or touches an open wound.
Health care workers can reduce, and in many cases eliminate, these risks
by using universal barrier precautions and standard sterilization and disinfection techniques recommended by the CDC and required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 3
45. Id. at 1332.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The term "parenteral" means "by injection into a muscle, vein or the subcutaneous tissues."
J.E. SCHMIDT, 3 ATroRNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER 57 (1991).
49. The mucous membrane is the moist membrane forming the lining of body cavities which
have an external opening on the body. SCHMIDT'S ArTORNEYs' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE M-893
(1991).
50. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1132.
51. Id. at 1131-32.
52. Semen Banking, Organ and Tissue Transplantation,and HIVAntibody Testing, 37 MOaaIDrry & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 57 (1988).
53. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64175, et seq. (1989). The OSHA requirements became effective March 6,
1992 and apply to 4.2 million health care workers. In Brief, AIDS POLICY & LAw 4 (Dec. 12,
1992). See 1987 Recommendations, supra note 43, at 64. Barrier precautions should be used when
touching blood, cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid and pericardial fluid
and amniotic fluid. Universal precautions do not apply to saliva, feces, nasal secretions, sputum,
sweat, tears, urine, or vomitus unless they are visibly contaminated with blood or the contact occurs
under circumstances in which visual confirmation is not possible. 1987 Recommendations,supra, at
9-10; 29 U.S.C. § 1910.1030(b) and § 1910.1030(d)(1) (West Supp. 1992), 56 Fed. Reg. 64,17564,176 (1989).
Workers should also wear gloves when touching mucous membranes, non-intact skin or when
performing venipuncture and other vascular access procedures, when drawing blood, and during all
invasive procedures, such as surgery. Update: Universal Precautionsfor Prevention of Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, HepatitisB Virus, and other Bloodborne Pathogensin HealthCareSettings, 37 MORBIDrTY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 377, 378, 380 (1988); 1987Recommendations, supra, at 6S.
Workers with open or oozing lesions, or weeping dermatitis, which might drip blood, should not
provide direct patient care. Id. Mouthpieces, resuscitation bags, or other ventilation devices be
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1. Procedures. Depending upon the risk they pose of HIV transmission, medical procedures can be classified as non-invasive, invasive or
exposure-prone. 4 Non-invasive procedures-which can be further subdivided into touching and talking procedures, open wound and mucous
membrane contact, and minor cutting-involve no real risk of HIV
transmission. Invasive procedures, which include most surgeries, present
some, but possibly negligible risk to patients. Exposure-prone procedures-which require the worker to operate inside a body cavity with
obscured vision or limited maneuverability-present the greatest risk of
HIV transmission from worker to patient.
The first, and least risky, type of non-invasive procedures are those
available for resuscitation even though saliva has not been implicated in HIV transmission. Id.; 29
U.S.C.A § 1910.1030(d)(2)(v) (West Supp. 1992), 56 Fed. Reg. 64,176 (1989).
Workers should change gloves between patients and should not attempt to disinfect or wash and
reuse gloves. See 29 U.S.C. § 1910.1030(d)(3)(ix)(A) (West Supp. 1992), 56 Fed. Reg. 64,177 (1989).
The CDC also recommends that workers wash their hands immediately after removing gloves. 1987
Recommendations, supra, at 6S. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(v) (West Supp. 1992), 56 Fed. Reg.
64,176 (1989). Workers should be careful to wash after contact with blood and before coming into
contact with other workers or patients. Foreign blood that spills on a patient should be cleaned
immediately. See, eg., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vi) (West Supp. 1992).
Instruments and other reusable equipment should be appropriately disinfected and sterilized.
Recommendationsfor Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and HepatitisB
Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. RR-8, at S6 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Recommendations]; CDC Guidelinesfor Prevention of Transmission of Human Immuno-deficiency Virus and HepatitisB Virus to Health-Careand
Public-Safety Workers, 38 MoRsmrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 16 (Supp. 6 1989) [hereinafter
1989 Recommendations]. Equipment that enters the patient's vascular system or other normally
sterile areas of the body should be sterilized before each use. Devices that touch intact mucous
membranes but do not penetrate the patient's body should be sterilized whenever possible and, if this
is not possible, they should at least undergo high-level disinfection before each use. Equipment that
does not touch the patient or that touches intact skin only needs to be cleaned with a detergent or as
otherwise indicated by the manufacturer. 1991 Recommendations,supra, at 2. See 1989Recommendations,supra,at 36-37 (Tbl 5), for a detailed explanation of the appropriate methods of sterilization
and disinfection.
Workers need to be careful to avoid pricking or cutting themselves with needles, scalpels and
other sharp instruments. 1987 Recommendations, supra, at 6S. Because most needlesticks occur
after use of the needle, the CDC Recommendations give detailed instructions on how to avoid postuse needlesticks. Id Workers should not break, bend or recap needles, but should dispose of needles
and sharp instruments in puncture resistant containers. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vi)
(West Supp. 1992). To protect against cuts during surgery, workers should avoid passing sharp
instruments from hand to hand. Instead, instruments should be laid on a sterile surface from which
they can be retrieved more safely. Using staples rather than suturing, and electrocautery rather than
staples also reduce the opportunity for cuts to workers.
If a needlestick or cut occurs, or a glove is torn, the glove should be removed and replaced
immediately to prevent the worker's blood from coming into contact with the patient's. The contaminated needle or instrument should be discarded and replaced with new, sterile equipment. Id.
at 6S, 7S, 9S; 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910.1030(d)(3)(ix)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
54. See, eg., notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
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in which the worker merely touches the patient's intact skin and talks to
the patient-taking a medical history, checking blood pressure and temperature, giving oral medications, bathing, massaging and manipulating
limbs, or performing a typical physical examination."5 These procedures
pose no known risk of HIV transmission to patients because there is no
opportunity for blood-to-blood transmission. 6 No mucous membrane or
non-intact skin contact occurs, and since no sharp objects are used, the
potential for needlestick or cut injuries is eliminated.
The second type of non-invasive procedure occurs when the worker
touches an open wound or mucous membrane, for example, dressing
wounds, administering suppositories and enemas, and performing gynecological, rectal and dental examinations. The possibility for blood-toblood transmission occurs only if the infected worker touches the patient's mucous membrane or open wound with cut or chapped hands.
This possibility, however, is eliminated when health care workers wear
gloves, and all workers should use gloves when performing these medical
procedures." As with the first type of non-invasive procedures, there is
no risk that the worker will cut herself because the procedures do not
require the use of sharp instruments. As long as workers use gloves during these procedures, the risk that their blood might come into contact
with the patient's mucous membrane or non-intact skin is nil.
The third category of non-invasive procedures involves minor cutting, but does not require the health care worker to enter a body cavitys--giving injections, starting intravenous tubes (IV's), and stitching
skin wounds. As with the other types of non-invasive procedures, risk
occurs only if the worker touches the patient's mucous membrane or broken skin with bloodied hands. However, these procedures require needles and other sharp instruments. Although all workers should wear
55. Even when a doctor looks in a patient's mouth or ears during a physical exam, it is the
instrument and not the doctor's hands that touch the patient's mucous membrane.
56. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 2; Summary: Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IJI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus in the Workplace, 34 MoRBmDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681, 681 (1985) [hereinafter
1985 Recommendations];Recommendationsfor PreventingTransmission ofInfection with Human TLymphotropic Virus Type II/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus During Invasive Procedures, 35
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 221 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Recommendations]; 1987Recommendations, supra note 43.
57. 1989 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 10; see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910(d)(3)(ix) (West Supp.
1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,177 (1989).
58. A body cavity is defined as any one of a number of spaces or potential spaces in the body.
For example, the space within the abdomen and the space within the chest. SCHMIDT, supra note 48,
at B-104.
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gloves while performing these procedures, a small chance exists that the
worker will be cut by the needle or sharp instrument during these procedures. The possibility of the worker's blood contacting the patient's broken skin or mucous membrane is almost nil because the worker's hands
remain outside the patient's body. A torn glove can be removed and
replaced immediately, thereby preventing the worker's blood from coming into contact with the patient's non-intact skin or mucous membrane.
Similarly, a contaminated needle or instrument can be discarded and replaced by new, sterile equipment without the worker or the contaminated
instrument touching the patient. 9 As with the other types of non-invasive procedures, the risk of blood-to-blood transmission is basically none.
Invasive procedures, which include most surgical procedures, require the health care worker to operate inside a body cavity with a sharp
instrument.' However, invasive procedures pose little risk of the worker
cutting herself because she has an unobstructed view of the patient's cavity and her instruments, and can maneuver freely.6 t
Invasive procedures pose a greater risk of HIV transmission to patients than non-invasive procedures; however, the risk is so small that
some still classify it as "no risk."'62 Since all workers should wear gloves
while performing invasive procedures,6" the risk of HIV transmission is
negligible. When a sharp object cuts a worker, the risk of HIV transmission occurs only under two conditions: (1) if the worker then bleeds into
the patient's body cavity, or (2) if the sharp object becomes contaminated
with the worker's blood and then touches the patient's body cavity.
However, during invasive procedures the worker can see the area of operation and has room to withdraw both her hands and the sharp object
59.

1987 Recommendations, supra note 43, at 6S, 7S, 9S.

60. I
61.

I at 6S, 7S. The CDC defines an invasive procedure as
surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic injuries (1) in
an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient setting, including
both physicians' and dentists' offices; (2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic procedures; (3) a vaginal or Cesarian delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during
which bleeding may occur, or (4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or
perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the potential
for bleeding exists.

Id
62. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 4.
63. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1910 (d) 1910.1030 (d)(3)(ix) (West Supp. 1992), 56 Fed. Reg. 64,177
(1989). The CDC also recommends that workers wear masks and protective eyewear during procedures likely to generate droplets of blood, to prevent exposure to the mucous membranes of the
mouth, eyes and nose. The CDC further recommends that gowns be worn during procedures that
are likely to generate splashes of blood. 1987 Recommendations, supra note 43, at 6S.
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from the body cavity without touching the patient. Thus, any risk to the
patient is almost non-existent.
Exposure-prone procedures are distinguished from invasive procedures because they require the worker to operate inside a body cavity
where vision is obscured or maneuverability is limited. Exposure-prone
procedures include some general, obstetrical, gynecological, cardiothoracic, colorectal and oral surgery as well as some non-surgical gynecological, orthopedic, cardiac and trauma procedures. 6" Exposure-prone
procedures create the greatest risk of needlestick injury to the health care
worker and thus the greatest risk of HIV transmission to the patient.6"
Although a worker can feel when she cuts herself, she may not have the
space or vision to be able to remove both her hand and the instrument
without touching the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues or mucous membrane.66
2. The Risk of Transmission. Although the risk of HIV transmission from an infected worker to a patient is greatest during exposureprone procedures, the actual risk of transmission is still minuscule. For
HIV transmission to take place three events must occur simultaneously:
(1) the infected health care worker must be cut; (2) the sharp object causing the cut must become contaminated with the health care worker's
blood and recontact the patient's open wound, or the worker's blood
must seep through the glove and come into contact with the patient's
open wound or mucous membrane; and (3) the worker's HIV infected
blood must actually transmit the virus to the patient.67
Predictions have placed the probability of all three events occurring
during an hour of surgery involving an HIV infected surgeon at less than
1 in 83,000.68 However, all such probability calculations are subject to
64. See 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 4.

65. Id
66. Id at 4-5.
67. See generally CDC OPEN MEETING, supra note 1, at 49 (testimony of Dr. David Bell).
68. Albert B. Lowenfels & Gary Wormser, Risk of Transmission of HIV from Surgeon to Patient, 325 NEw ENG. . MED. 888, 889 (1991) (letter to the editor) (with upper and lower confidence
levels of I in 28,000 and 1 in 500,000). The authors reached this figure by multiplying the
probability of a puncture injury occurring during surgery by the probability that the HIV virus
would actually be transmitted. They estimate the likelihood of a puncture injury to be 4 to 12 per

1000 hours, with a median of 8 per 1000 (0.008), and that the probability of HIV transmission is
0.0015, half as much as the .003 probability of conversion with patient to worker exposure. The
actual risk is probably much lower. The authors did not take into account the fact that not only

must a puncture occur, but that the worker must also bleed into the patient's wound or the sharp
object contaminated with the worker's blood must recontact the patient's body cavity.
The CDC estimates the probability of all three events occurring during one operation by an HIV
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the same criticism: the scarcity of data. Reliable data on the frequency
of cuts and needlestick injuries during invasive and exposure-prone procedures does not exist. Only seven prospective studies of sharp instrument injuries during surgery have been conducted, and they do not
distinguish among types of invasive procedures or between invasive and
exposure-prone procedures.6 9 Only one study has observed the rate at
which instruments which have cut workers recontact with the patient's

wound.7" No studies relate the incidence of instrument injuries to dentists and other dental workers.7 1 Moreover, the exact quantum of risk of

HIV virus transmission from a cut or needlestick injury to an infected
worker is unknown. No prospective studies assessing this risk have been
conducted, and the five reported cases of transmission-all involving Dr.
Acer-are too few to be conclusive.

Nevertheless, given what is known about HIV transmission via
blood, the risk of transmission from infected worker to patient if an infected worker does suffer a cut or stick in which the worker's HIV infected blood contacts the patient's open wound or mucous membrane is
extraordinarily low-less than .3% to .5%. The likelihood of AIDS
transmission through blood depends on the amount of blood involved:
72
the less HIV contaminated blood, the less chance of transmission.

Thus, the risk of transmission following a blood transfusion with tainted
blood is 89%,

73

while the risk of transmission of the HIV virus from an

infected surgeon to range from about .0024% to .00024%, or about 1 in 42,000 to 1 in 417,000.
CDC OPEN MEETING, supra note 1, at 49-53 (testimony of Dr. David Bell). Dr. Bell estimated that
sharp injuries occurred in 6.9% of operations, and that the rate of recontact with the patient's
wound was 32%. Since there was no data on the risk of infection to a patient after a recontact
exposure, Dr. Bell used data on the risk of infection from a patient to a health care worker after a
percutaneous exposure to infected blood. This figure is .3%. Dr. Bell's figures also probably overestimate the risk because he did not take into account that the likelihood of actual transmission of the
virus when worker to patient blood exposure occurs should be less than the .3% figure for patient to
worker exposure. See infra text notes 74, 79-80.
69. See CDC OPEN MEETING, supra note 1, at 53-54.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Friedland & Klein, supranote 42, at 1126-27 (explaining that the risk of seroconversion
after HIV virus exposure depends upon the mode of transmission, the virulence of the HIV strain,
the susceptibility of the host, the stage of the infection of the source and the dose of the virus); John
W. Mosley, The Transfusion Study Group: The Transfusion Safety Study, in THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIDS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (Abstract & Tort 10.2 1987); NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:

UPDATE

1988:

DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH,

HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH (1988) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS] (explaining that there is
an eighty-nine percent chance of HIV infection from a blood transfusion with HIV infected blood,
but only a .3 to .5% risk of infection from a needlestick injury); see also Deborah M. Barnes, Health
Workers andAIDS. QuestionsPersist, 241 SCIENCE 161, 162 (1988).
73. See CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 72.
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infected patient to a health care worker following a single cut or needlestick injury is between .3% to .5%.14
The risk of transmission from an infected health care worker to a
patient following a cut or needlestick should be less than the .3% to .5%
risk calculated for patient to worker transmission following a cut or
needlestick, because generally patients are exposed to smaller amounts of
a worker's blood when an accidental worker injury occurs. Transmissions from infected patients to workers primarily involve transmissions
74. David Henderson et al., Risk of Occupational Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) Associated With Clinical Exposures, 113 ANNAiS INTERNAL MED. 740, 74046 (1990); Ruthanne Marcus et al., Surveillance of Health-Care Workers Exposed to Blood from
PatientsInfected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1118, 1119-20
(1988); see Friedland & Klein, supranote 42, at 1130-31; see also 1987 Recommendations, supra note
43, at S5, S12.
Still, the number of instances of documented transmission from infected patient to worker are too
few to be certain of accuracy; the real risk may be somewhat higher or lower, in the range of 0.01%
to 0.9%, or I in 10,000 to 9 in 1,000. The exact risk cannot be better calibrated until current studies
are complete. See Friedland & Klein, supra, note 42, at 1130-31 (explaining that the upper and
lower confidence limits of present studies range from .76% to 2.0%).
In a CDC study of 860 health care workers who were exposed to HIV infected blood by a needlestick or cut, only four workers tested positive for HIV eighteen months after exposure, a seroconversion rate of .42%. Three of the workers experienced the acute retroviral syndrome which is
associated with seroconversion, and investigation revealed no non-occupational risk factors. For the
fourth worker, blood collected within thirty days of exposure was not available. Non-occupational
transmission could be ruled out because this person had an HIV infected partner. Marcus, supra. In
another study of 180 workers with 215 needlestick exposures to HIV infected blood only one person
seroconverted; a seroconversion rate of .47%. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004 (1989) (citing Julie L. Gerbinding et al., Risk of OccupationalTransmission in Intensively Exposed Health Care Workers (HC99:
Follow-up, in THE TwENTY-EIGrrH INTERsCIENcE CONFERENCE ON ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS
AND CHEMOTHERAPY (ICAAC) (Abstract # 343, 1988).
Only one person seroconverted in a University of California study of 625 needlestick and cut
injuries, a seroconversion rate of .16%. 1989 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 7. In a National
Institutes of Medicine study of 137 workers with needlestick injuries only one worker with a needlestick has seroconverted. While this would lead to a seroconversion rate of .2%, it is unconfirmed that
infection resulted from a single needlestick injury. It is possible the worker had more than one
exposure by needlestick. See Friedland & Klein, supra, 1130-31; see generally Updat" Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Health Care Workers Exposed to the Blood of Infected Patients,36
MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 285 (1987) [hereinafter HCWExposure] (noting four cases
where health care workers contracted AIDS from patients following needlestick injuries).
The relatively low risk of transmission from patient to health care worker is confirmed by the fact
that there have been only sixty-five reports of health care workers worldwide contracting AIDS in
the workplace. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,016 (1989).
Of the thirty published cases of occupational transmission, eighteen involved health care workers
who accidentally stuck themselves with needles containing contaminated blood. 56 Fed. Reg.
64,004, 64,016 (1989). In seven cases, exposure occurred by transmission through a mucous membrane or non-intact skin. In two cases, the transmission was the result of cuts with sharp, HIV
contaminated objects. Id
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via hollow-bore needles, the type used to give injections. 75 The solid-bore
suture needles used in surgical procedures-those most likely to be involved in patient exposure-absorb less blood than do hollow-bore needles, thus posing less risk of HIV transmission. 6 Moreover, passage of a
needle or other sharp object through a worker's glove after a worker cuts
himself tends to wipe the instrument clean, reducing even further the
amount of worker blood to which the patient may be exposed."
Although we may not be able to quantify exactly the risk of worker
to patient transmission, its extreme unlikelihood is corroborated by the
fact that there are no reported cases of HIV transmission from surgeon to
patient, even though estimates conclude that between 470 and 4,700 surgeons are HIV positive.7 8 Studies tracking the patients of five HIV positive surgeons who collectively operated on 4,703 patients found none
who had been infected by these surgeons even though the surgeons performed many highly invasive and exposure-prone procedures, including
thoracic, abdominal, vascular, and colorectal surgery. 9
The only reported cases of HIV transmission from a health care
75. See generally supra note 77.
76. See generally Lowenfels & Wormser, supra note 68, at 889.
77. CDC OPEN MEETING, supra note 1, at 52 (testimony of Dr. David Bell).
78. See Ban Mishu et al., A Surgeon with AIDS: Lack ofEvidence for Transmission to Patients,
264 JAMA 467 (1990).
79. See, eg., infra note 80. One HIV infected general surgeon operated on 2,160 patients and
performed many highly invasive, and exposure-prone procedures, including thoracic, abdominal,
vascular, and colorectal surgery. None of the 2,160 patients the surgeon operated on since 1982
appeared in the state AIDS registry. Six hundred sixteen patients consented to HIV testing and only
one tested positive, an intravenous drug user who was probably already HIV infected and symptomatic at the time the surgeon operated on him in 1984. Id
See also Jeffrey J. Sacks, AIDSin a Surgeon, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1017, 1017 (1985). Another
HIV-infected surgeon operated on 400 patients over a six year period. The author studied 400 patients of this Florida surgeon who died of AIDS in 1983 by reviewing state health department
records; no former patients have been reported as contracting AIDS. Id
See also John D. Porter et al., Management ofPatients Treated by a Surgeon with HIVInfection,
335 LANCET 113 (1990). A British surgeon infected with HIV operated on 339 patients. No cases of
AIDS have been reported among former patients. Of seventy-six patients who consented to testing,
none tested positive. See id
See also Francis Page Armstrong et al., Investigation of a Health Care Worker with Symptomatic
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection: An Epidemiologic Approach, 152 MIL. MED. 414 (1987).
A military surgeon diagnosed with AIDS in 1985 performed 679 inpatient surgical procedures and
1,125 outpatient surgeries. No former patients reported contracting AIDS; seventy.five sought HIV
testing, but none tested positive. Id. at 415-16.
See also Richard Danita et al., A Look-Back Investigation of Patientsof an HIV-Infected Physician, 325 NEW ENG. 3. MED. 1406 (1991). Researchers notified 336 patients of an HIV-infected
family physician. The patients had undergone invasive procedures at a time when the doctor had a
severe dermatitis on his hands and forearms. None of the patients tested HIV positive. Id. at 1408.
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worker to patient, five in all, involve one dentist: Dr. David Acer. ° No
other dentist-to-patient transmission has been reported."' The single
look-back study 2 of an infected dentist involved an infected dental student who performed invasive procedures during his training.8 3 One hundred sixty-three of his former patients were contacted and none reported
HIV infection." All one hundred forty-three former patients tested HIV
negative.85
The clustering of cases around Dr. Acer has lead the CDC to theorize that HIV transmission occurred because Dr. Acer dramatically increased the risk of HIV transmission due to serious breaches in standard
infection control procedures.8 6 Dr. Acer and his staff did not change
gloves between patients and did not properly sterilize dental equipment. 7 Dr. Acer may even have used his dental equipment on himself,
80. See Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a PatientDuring an Invasive Dental Procedure,39 MoRBmrrY & MORTALrrY WKLy. REP. 489 (1990) [hereinafter Dental
Transmission];see also Update" Transmission ofHIVInfection During an Invasive DentalProcedure
- Florida,40 MoRBIDrry & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 21, 33 (1991) [hereinafter Dental Transmission Update #1].
81. See infra note 86.
82. Robert W. Comer et al., Management Considerationsfor an HIVPositiveDentalStudent, 55
J. DENT. EDuc. 187, 191 (1991).
83. IJd at 190-91.
84. Id at 191.
85. Id
86. Dental Transmission Update #1, supra note 80, at 25-26. Twenty four months before her
diagnosis with AIDS a patient had two teeth extracted by a dentist who had AIDS. The dentist had
been diagnosed with AIDS three months before the dental procedure. Dental Transmission, supra
note 80, at 489. According to the CDC the case is consistent with transmission during the tooth
extraction, but other sources of transmission cannot be ruled out. Id at 491.
The factors weighing in favor of transmission are that an invasive procedure was conducted at a
time when the dentist was HIV positive; the dentist recalled occasional needlesticks with narrowgauge needles used to administer local anesthetic; interviews with the patient and other people did
not identify any other risk factors; DNA sequencing data indicated a high degree of similarity between the HIV strains infecting the dentist and the patient; and the patient suffered a pharyngitis
four weeks after the tooth extraction. Id
The factors weighing against transmission include no evidence that the patient was exposed to the
dentist's blood; the dentist wore gloves and did not recall a needlestick or cut resulting in visible
blood during the extraction; other risk factors cannot be conclusively ruled out since they involved
such sensitive personal behavior; DNA sequencing is just beginning to be developed and the results
of the similarities cannot be quantified; the patient's bout of pharyngitis was not accompanied by the
fever, rash or generalized lymph node enlargement which has generally been described in cases of
acute retroviral syndrome; and finally, the time between alleged transmission and development of
AIDS was only 24 months-only I% of infected homosexual/bisexual men and 5% of transfusion
recipients develop AIDS in this short a period of time. Id.
87. Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-infected Health Care Professional: Employment Policies and
Public Health, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 311, 312 (1990); CDC Definition GuidelinesSaid to
be Based on Faulty HIV Transmission Assessment, AIDS POLICY & LAW I (June 26, 1991).
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and then failed to sterilize the equipment before using it to treat other

patients."8 Some speculate that Dr. Acer punctured himself with a hypodermic needle while injecting local anesthetic, then used the bloodied
needle to inject the patient with the anesthetic and his infected blood.8 9

Others speculate that no worker-to-patient transmission occurred, but
that Dr. Acer may have treated an HIV infected patient and then used
the unsterilized equipment on other patients, including Bergalis.9 0 All
these behaviors are so contrary to standard infection control procedures
that some medical professionals and the media speculate that Dr. Acer
infected his patients intentionally. 91 Nevertheless, the five patients who

contracted AIDS represented a small portion of the 850 former patients
of Dr. Acer who were tested for the virus.92
3. Health Care Workers and Work- CDC Recommendations. The
risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to patient is so slight
that no public health agency has recommended banning all infected

health care workers from practice. The CDC's most recent Recommendations on preventing HIV transmission to patients, issued in July of
1991, recommend that HIV infected health care workers be allowed to
perform non-invasive and invasive procedures not identified as exposureprone as long as they practice standard surgical or dental techniques and

comply with universal precautions, sterilization and disinfection recommendations. 9 The CDC does recommend restrictions on infected work88. See id,
89. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: An AIDS Puzzle: What Went Wrong In
Dentist's Office?, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991, at C3.
90. See id; see alsoHandpieceofDentist'sDrillMay HaveSpread AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1991, at 18; What's News," World Wide, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at Al.
91. John Doschner, Deadly Dentist, MACON TELEGRAPH AND NEWS, Dec. 26, 1991, at 2D.
For several months this theory circulated quietly among medical professionals. In February 1991,
John Hardie of the Canadian Dental Association expressed the opinion publicly at a CDC Meeting.
92. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 3.
93. Id. at 5. They state:
Currently available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of
HCWs infected with HIV or HBV [hepatitis] who perform invasive procedures not identified as exposure-prone, provided the infected HCWs practice recommended surgical or
dental technique and comply with universal precautions and current recommendations
for sterilization/disinfection.
Id.
The CDC has issued recommendations on workers infected with HIV in 1985, 1986, 1987 and
1991. While the recommendations have changed as public health professionals have learned more
about HIV and its risks in the health care setting, all the recommendations have stressed the need for
universal barrier precautions and none have recommended that health care workers infected with the
HIV virus routinely be excluded from practicing all invasive procedures.
The initial CDC Guidelines issued in 1985 recommended that infected workers continue to per-
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ers who perform exposure-prone procedures. The CDC suggests that
infected workers not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they
have sought guidance from an expert review panel made up of the
worker's physician, an infectious disease specialist with expertise in HIV
transmission, a health professional with expertise in the procedures performed by the worker, and state or local public health officials.94 The
panel should determine the "circumstances, ifany, under which the
health care worker may continue to perform exposure-prone proceform non-invasive procedures, and indicated that the CDC was considering "[w]hether... restrictions [in addition to universal barrier precautions] are indicated for HCWs who perform invasive
procedures." 1985 Recommendations, supra note 56, at 691. The 1986 Guidelines specifically addressed invasive procedures, concluding that as long as barrier precautions were used, all infected
workers could safely continue all professional practice, including invasive procedures. 1986 Recommendations,supra note 56, at 223. The 1987 guidelines did not distinguish between invasive and
non-invasive procedures. They recommended an "individual review" by the worker's personal physician and the employing institution's employee health service and medical director to determine
whether an infected worker "can adequately and safely be allowed to perform patient care duties."
1987 Recommendations,supra note 43, at 15S. For a detailed discussion of the 1985-87 sets of CDC
Recommendations and the differences among them see Barnes, supra note 72, at 313-14.
The 1987 CDC guidelines created confusion. On the one hand, the CDC concluded that the risk
of infection from a health care worker to a patient was so slight that there was no need for routine
testing to determine which workers were infected. On the other hand, the CDC's recommendation
of an individual review of known infected workers implied that the risk was high enough that some
work restrictions might be appropriate. 1987 Recommendations, supra note 43, at 15S. The 1987
Recommendations gave no guidance on which procedures might create a risk and what types of
practice restrictions might be appropriate. Despite these mixed signals, many public health and
professional organizations adopted the 1987 CDC Recommendations as their official position. See
Barnes, supra note 72, at 314.
As the stories surfaced in Florida about possible transmissions from Dr. Acer to his patients, the
gaps in the CDC's 1987 Recommendations became clear. The CDC began reviewing data and gathering additional evidence in order to issue updated, more specific recommendations. In February,
1991, the CDC conducted two days of hearings, taking testimony from a wide variety of groups and
individuals about the risks posed by HIV infected workers and how infected workers should be
treated in the workplace. The testimony focused on the issue of the risks posed by workers performing invasive procedures. See CDC OPEN MEETING, supra note 1.
The most recent CDC guidelines were issued July 1991. First, the guidelines clearly distinguish
between invasive and non-invasive procedures and reiterate the CDC's consistent position that workers performing non-invasive procedures pose no risk to patients as long as they use universal barrier
precautions. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 3-4.
Second, the guidelines distinguish between two types of invasive procedures: those that are exposure-prone and those that are not. According to the CDC, non-exposure-prone procedures pose a
substantially lower risk than exposure-prone procedures and possibly no risk of transmission from a
health care worker to a patient as long as universal precautions, sterilization and disinfection requirements are followed. Id at 4. The Recommendations state that non-exposure-prone procedures
pose "a substantially lower risk, if any, of transmitting HIV... from an infected [health care
worker] to patients." Id
94. Id
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dures." 95 Such circumstances should include notifying prospective patients of the worker infection before they undergo exposure-prone
invasive procedures.9 6
The CDC's July, 1991 Recommendations to restrict health care
workers who perform exposure-prone procedures have met massive opposition from medical and professional groups,97 state health departments, 98 and AIDS activists. 9 9 The chief criticism of the CDC
Recommendations is that their categorical restrictions on exposure-prone
procedures are not supported by scientific evidence."° While exposureprone procedures are more risky than invasive procedures, no reliable
data establishes that all exposure-prone procedures present a risk to patients great enough to justify the routine use of expert review panels or
mandatory patient notification.
95. Id. The CDC does not recommend an outright prohibition on infected workers performing
exposure-prone procedures. Rather, the CDC recommends an individual determination:
HCWs who are infected with HIV or HBV (and are HBeAg positive) should not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert review
panel and been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform
these procedures. Such circumstances would include notifying prospective patients of
the HCW's seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures.

Id
The CDC warns that review panels should present a balanced perspective including that of the
worker's physician, an infectious disease specialist with expertise in HIV transmission, a health professional with expertise in the procedures performed by the worker, and state or local public health
officials. Id. For institutionally based workers, the panel might also include someone from the institution's infection control committee, preferably a hospital epidemiologist. Id. The CDC cautions
review panels to recognize the importance of confidentiality and the privacy rights of infected workers. Id.
96. Id
97. See Infectious Disease Group Says CDC GuidelinesBoth "Deficient"and in Violation of U.S.
Laws, in AIDS POLICY & LAW 1 (Jan. 23, 1992). The groups expressing opposition include the
Infectious Diseases Society of America, the American College of Surgeons, (Surgeons Rebuff U.S.
AIDS Request, N.Y. Tims, Oct. 25, 1991, at A21), the American Dental Association (Lawrence K.
Altman, Dentist's Group Offers No List for AIDS Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at A12), the
California Medical Association and the California Nurses Association. In fact, for a while the
American Medical Association was the only professional organization to support the CDC Recommendations. However, in December the AMA's House of Delegates voted to abandon the organization's publicly stated position to cooperate with the CDC in naming the exposure-prone procedures
that would be subject to expert panel review. Warren E. Leary, A.MA. Backs Off on an AIDS Risk
List, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at 38.
98. The New York and Michigan state health departments have gone on record in opposition to
the CDC recommendations. See CDC Says it Plansto List Dangerous ProceduresDespite Opposition
of Medical,AIDS Groups, AIDS POLICY AND LAW 12 (Oct. 31, 1991).
99. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Gay Men's Health Crisis have expressed concern for the lack of scientific, public health, and legal
support for the CDC recommendations. See DANGEROUS PROCEDURES, supra note 98.
100. Id
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The recommendations can also be criticized as significantly underinclusive. They ignore the fact that a sloppy worker who does not use
gloves may be a greater risk to patients during non-invasive and invasive
procedures than a careful worker who fully complies with barrier precautions and avoids cuts and needlesticks during exposure-prone

procedures.
Moreover, the CDC's definition of exposure-prone procedures subject to expert panel review is radically overinclusive, because it includes
almost every form of surgical procedure, even though many of these procedures pose little risk of transmission. 0 1 The only documented procedure implicated in worker to patient transmission is dental surgery; these
transmissions occurred following serious, possibly criminal lapses in
standard infection control procedures. In short, the consistent criticism
of the CDC's Recommendations is that the evidence necessary to support
the broad categorical restriction is insufficient.
In response to these criticisms the CDC dropped a proposal to designate specific procedures as exposure prone.102 Indeed, for a time it appeared that the CDC might replace its 1991 Recommendations with
directions that any review panel determination to restrict the practice of
an HIV-infected health care worker should take into account the
worker's technique, skill and medical status as well as the specific procedure.10 s However, on June 18, 1992 the CDC announced that it will not
revise the Recommendations. °0
In late 1991 Congress enacted the Modified Leadership Amendment' 0 requiring states to adopt the CDC's recommendations or
for the prevention of HIV transmission in the
equivalent provisions
health care setting."0 6 The CDC has given states until October 28, 1992
101. In an October 7, 1991 "Dear Colleague" letter to representatives of twenty-two health
organizations, the CDC suggested that six categories of procedures be considered for inclusion in a
list of exposure-prone procedures. These included: intra-abdominal and colorectal surgery, intra-

thoracic surgery, including cardiac surgery, major orthopedic surgery, major gynecological surgery,
caesarian deliveries, vaginal deliveries requiring suturing and surgery in the oral cavity. DANGEROUS PROCEDURES, supra note 98.
102. See In Brief,AIDS POLICY & LAW 3 (Dec. 12, 1991).
103. mL at 4.
104. PHS, After Nearly a Year of Controversy, Won't Revise Infected Worker Guidelines, AIDS
POLICY & LAW 1 (June 26, 1992) [hereinafter Infected Worker Guidelines].
105. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub.L.
No. 102-41, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (1991).
106. The legislation requires states to promulgate:
guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or guidelines which are equivalent
to those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control concerning recommendations
for preventing the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus and the hepatitis
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to certify that they have implemented the CDC guidelines or equivalents.
The CDC has indicated that it will give states latitude in implementing
equivalent guidelines including giving consideration to states that decide
to determine exposure prone procedures on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the skill, technique and possible impairment of the worker
as well as the specific procedure.10 7 While some states have adopted the
CDC guidelines, others are proposing alternative criteria for evaluating
whether HIV infected health care workers will be allowed to continue
patient care. As states scramble to adopt guidelines, HIV infected health
care workers face the possibility of broad restrictions on practice. Any
such restrictions must comply with the applicable requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
II. AIDS AS PROTECTED DISABILITY UNDER THE REHABILITATION
ACT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A.

The Statutory Structure

Two federal antidiscrimination statutes protect HIV infected health
care workers: the Rehabilitation Act of 1973101 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.1 "9 Both acts mandate that infected workers be allowed
to continue patient care as long as they do not present a significant risk to
patients.110 The following subsection surveys the two statutes.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973111 was enacted to enable handicapped people to achieve their full
productive capability, to foster their self-sufficiency and independence,
and to integrate them into the community.1 12 Congressional supporters
were concerned about the lack of access to education, as well as the unB virus during exposure prone invasive procedures, except for emergency situations
when the patient's life or limb is in danger.... Compliance with such guidelines shall be
the responsibility of the State Public Health Official. Said responsibility shall include a
process for determining what appropriate disciplinary or other actions shall be taken to
ensure compliance.
Id.
107. Infected Worker Guidelines, supra note 104, at 8.
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795(i) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1991).
110. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795(i) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
112. Donald J. Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:RehabilitatingSection 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 171, 172-76 (1980).
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employment and underemployment of handicapped people." 3 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service ....
The Rehabilitation Act's non-discrimination requirements reach
any "recipients" of "federal financial assistance.""' 5 Federal financial
assistance includes federal money awarded through grant, loan or contract, excluding federal contracts of insurance or guaranty." 6 A "recipient" is any public or private entity that receives federal financial
assistance. 117

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination in any "program or
activity" that receives federal funds." The Rehabilitation Act defines
"program or activity" broadly so that, generally, it prohibits discrimination throughout an entire agency or institution if any portion receives
federal financial assistance." 9 It applies to recipients' employment prac113. James F. Baxley, RehabilitatingAIDS-Based Employment Discrimination: HIV Infection
asa Handicap Under the VocationalRehabilitationAct of 1973, 19 SETON HALL L. REv. 23 (1989).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The Rehabilitation Act is patterned after Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (citing S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3940 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373).
The Rehabilitation Act also imposes affirmative action obligations. Section 503 requires contractors with federal contracts valued in excess of $2,500 to take affirmative action to hire and promote
disabled individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1988). Section 501 requires the federal government to take
affirmative action with respect to its disabled employees. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1988).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1988).
116. Id. "Federal financial assistance means any grant, loan, or contract (other than a procure-

ment contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty)..

" 45 C.F.R § 84.3(h) (1991) But see,

Moore v Sun Bank of N. Fla., N.A., 923 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that regulations which
excluded contracts of insurance or guaranty from definition of "federal financial assistance" in Section 504 were inconsistent with the language of the statute and with legislative intent, and thus
agency's interpretation was not reasonable and regulations were invalid with respect to exclusion).
117. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 706(3), 721(a)(2), 794(b) (1992). Implementing regulations define recipients as:
[A]ny state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or other entity, or any
person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient, but excluding the
ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(t) (1991).
118. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (a) (West. Supp. 1992); 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1990).
119. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b) (West Supp. 1992). Lower courts interpreted the "program or
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tices as well as to their standards and methods of administration.1 20
Although the Rehabilitation Act expressly provides only for administrative enforcement,"' a private right of action exists for individuals to
activity" language in the Rehabilitation Act to give the statute a broad, institution-wide application,
but in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase
narrowly and held that Title IX (which like the Rehabilitation Act is modeled after Title VI) prohibits discrimination only in the particular educational program or activity receiving the federal assistance, not in all the educational programs and activities conducted by the recipient institution. lil at
570-73.
In 1988 Congress overrode a presidential veto and enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The Civil Rights Restoration Act amends the Rehabilitation Act and the other anti-discrimination acts that are modeled on Title VI by adding provisions
to define the meaning of the phrase "program or activity." For educational institutions where federal aid is extended anywhere within a college, university, or public system of higher education, the
entire institution or system is covered. If federal aid is extended anywhere in an elementary or
secondary school system, the entire system is covered. For state and local governments, only the
department or agency that receives the aid is covered. Where one entity of a state or local govern.
ment receives federal aid and distributes it to another department, both entities are covered. For
private corporations, if the aid is extended to the corporation as a whole, or if the corporation
provides a public service, such as health care, social services, education, or housing, the entire corporation is covered. If the federal aid is extended to only one geographically separate facility, only that
facility is covered. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1988).
The Rehabilitation Act also ensures that recipients of federal money do not discriminate in pro.
viding services, money or goods to the ultimate beneficiaries of the program. See S.REP. No. 318,
93rd Cong., IstSess. 50 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2123; see also 45 C.F.R.
§§ 84.1, 84.4 (1991). Recipients do not include the ultimate beneficiaries who receive money and
services from the programs and activities that receive federal assistance. Thus, senior citizens who
receive Medicare and poor people who receive Medicaid are not subject to the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
120. The employment provision of the Rehabilitation Act is unlike Title VI which applies only
to employment practices where a primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide
employment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-3 (West Supp. 1992); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1630.7 (West Supp. 1992).
See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
121. The remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act borrow from Title VI. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(2) (1978). Federal agencies that award federal financial assistance may refuse to grant
funds and may terminate funding to any recipient found in violation of the Rehabilitation Act or its
implementing regulations after an opportunity for an administrative hearing. The federal agency
need not seek a court order, but the fund recipient may seek judicial review of the agency's action.
Id. Title VI states:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 2000d-1 of this title shall be
subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar action
taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue financial
assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any requirement imposed pursuant to
section 2000d-1 of this title, any person aggrieved including any State or political subdivision thereof and any person aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision
thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance
with chapter 7 of [5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706] and such action shall not be deemed committed
to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of that chapter.
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enforce both the statute and its implementing regulations." The remedies available to a private plaintiff do not include termination of federal
funding.123 However, a private plaintiff who proves intentional discrimination can recover both retrospective and prospective equitable relief, including reinstatement, promotion or hiring, and backpay. 2 4 The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a Section 504 private
plaintiff can recover compensatory and punitive damages, 2 ' and has
also left open the question of the relief available to a Section 504 plaintiff
who proves disproportionate adverse impact discrimination, but who
discriminate.126 Prevailing plaintiffs may also
does not prove intent to
127
recover attorneys' fees.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1988).
Although a federal funding recipient may not discriminate in any of its activities if any part of it
receives federal financial assistance, see supra note 119, the administrative sanction for violation of
the Rehabilitation Act is termination of federal funds only to the "particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been found." 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1990). Federal funds
earmarked for a specific purpose are not terminated unless discrimination is found in the use of those
funds or the use of those funds is affected by discrimination elsewhere in the operation of the recipient. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VI case).
122. See Consolidated Rail v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, at 630 (1984). Although the Supreme
Court has never considered whether Section 504 gives rise to a private right of action, since the
Court has held that both Title VI and Title IX give rise to a private right of action, it seems certain
that the Court would find a private right of action for Section 504. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); Id. at 639 (Stevens,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ); Id at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Title VI);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Neither has the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required under Section 504. However, in Cannon, the Supreme Court held that a
Title IX plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Since Title IX, like Section 504,
is modeled on Title VI, lower courts have generally relied on Cannon in holding that exhaustion is
not required under Section 504. See New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678
F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982); Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 474 U.S. 936 (1985); Camenish v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980),
vacated 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
123. See infra note 124.
124. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 630-31 (1984) (back pay); see also
Guardians,463 U.S. at 602.03 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment. Id. at 624-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 635-39 (Stevens, Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
125. See ConsolidatedRail,465 U.S. at 637 (Section 504); Guardians,463 U.S. at 630 (Title VI).
Lower courts are divided on the issue. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372,
1377 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981); ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 106.37 (1990).
126. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-309 (1985).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2)(b) (1978).
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2. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct. The Americans with Disabilities Act,128 enacted on July 30, 1990, was intended to expand the
scope of protection for individuals with disabilities far beyond that provided in the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA extends the reach of federal
protection of the disabled beyond programs and activities that receive
federal financial assistance. It precludes disability discrimination in a
broad array of settings including private employment, public transportation and public accommodations operated by private entities. 12 9 In addition, the remedies available under the 0ADA are broader than those
13
available under the Rehabilitation Act.
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination by private
employers. 131 It became effective July, 1992 for employers with 25 or
more employees, and expands to include employers with fifteen or more
employees in July, 1994.132 The employment discrimination provisions
apply to physicians' offices, clinics, laboratories and other employers who
have the requisite minimum number of employees regardless of whether
they accept Medicare, Medicaid or other federal money.
Title I incorporates by reference the remedies and procedures provided in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133 An individual must
134
first file a charge with the EEOC before proceeding in federal court.
The EEOC will use its Title VII procedures to investigate charges filed
under the ADA; it will receive and investigate charges of discrimination
and, as appropriate, initiate proceedings and bring civil actions in individual cases against employers shown to have engaged in an open pattern
and practice of discrimination.13 5
The remedies available to an ADA Title I plaintiff are those pro128.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, et seq. (West Supp. 1992).

129. Id.§ 12101.
130. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117 (West Supp. 1992) with 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1978).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1992).
132. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1992). Title I covers employers, employment
agencies, labor organizations and joint labor-management committees. Id. § 12111(2). An employer
is a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce." Id. § 12111(5)(A). To be covered an
employer must have the requisite number of employees "for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year." Id Religious entities are covered by the ADA.
However, they are permitted to give preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion
and may require all applicants and employees to conform to the tenets of their religion. Id.
§ 12111(8); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16 (1991). The ADA excludes from coverage the U.S. government
and corporations wholly owned by the U.S. Government, Indian Tribes and bona fide private membership clubs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(a)(b) (West Supp. 1992).
134. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6-1601.29 (1991).
135. IA
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vided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and include the "make-whole" remedies of reinstatement, promotion, hiring and back pay. 13 6 In addition, if the defendant employs 500 or more employees, each prevailing plaintiff can recover
compensatory and punitive damages of up to $300,000.137 Jury trials are
available for claims of intentional discrimination and prevailing parties
can recover attorney's fees. 138
Title II of the ADA, which became effective January 26, 1992, provides that no qualified individual with a disability may be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of any service, program or activity of a public entity. 139 Most of this Title's provisions deal with transportation provided to the general public, including bus, rail, taxi, and
limousine service, but excluding aircraft covered by the Air Carriers Access Act. 1"
Title II adopts the rights, remedies and procedures available under the Rehabilitation Act. 141
Title III of the ADA, effective January 26, 1992, outlaws discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.14 2 Public accommodations are defined broadly to include the professional offices of
health care providers as well143 as hotels, restaurants, theaters, private
schools and day care centers.
The remedies and procedures available under Title III are borrowed
from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Title III may be en136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
137. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977 (A)(b)(3)(D), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073
(1991).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1991).
139. Id § 12131.
140. Ia § 12141.
141. Id § 12133; see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
142. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (West Supp. 1992).
143. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (West Supp. 1992). To define public accommodation, the ADA
lists twelve categories of private entities which would be considered public accommodations if the
operations of such entities affected commerce: places of lodging (such as inns, hotels, and motels),
except those in which the proprietor resides and rents out five or fewer rooms; establishments serving
food or drink; places of entertainment (such as movie houses, theaters, concert halls, and stadiums);
gathering places (such as auditoriums and convention centers); retail sales establishments (such as
bakeries, grocery stores, clothing stores, and shopping centers); service establishments (such as laundromats, banks, and doctors' and lawyers' offices); public transportation terminals; cultural facilities
(including museums, libraries, and galleries); parks and zoos; places of education; social service centers (including day care centers, shelters, and food banks); and places of exercise or recreation (such
as golf courses, health spas, and bowling alleys). Id
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188 (West Supp. 1992); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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forced by the United States Attorney General or by private action. 145
Courts can order alterations and structural changes in facilities to make
them accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities.146 Courts
may also order the provision of auxiliary aids or services, and modification of policies or procedures. 4 7 Courts may award monetary damages
and may assess civil penalties of $50,000 for a first violation and $100,000
149
48
for any subsequent violations; 1 punitive damages are not available.
A prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and
costs. 150

Title III took effect on January 26, 1992. However, the Title provides for a limited grace period; during the first six months no civil action
may be brought against a business with 25 or fewer employees and gross
receipts of one million dollars or less; and during the first year, actions
may not be brought against businesses with ten or fewer employees and
15
gross receipts of $500,000 or less. 1
3. Coverage of Health Care Workers. Most hospital and nursing
home employees with disabilities are protected by both the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disability Act. Today, almost every
hospital and nursing home accepts federal financial assistance in the form
of Medicaid and Medicare and is therefore subject to the Rehabilitation
Act's non-discrimination requirements.15 2 These hospitals and nursing
145. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12188(a)(1), 12188(b) (West Supp. 1992).
146. Id § 12188(a)(2).
147. Id
148. Id § 12188(b)(2)(c).
149. Id § 12188(b)(4).
150. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3 (b) (West Supp. 1992).
151. Pub.L. 101-336, 310(b), 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
152. Both Medicaid and Medicare are "federal financial assistance" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Regional Medical Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278,
1289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr.,
736 F.2d 1039, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985). The
Rehabilitation Act regulations list a number of other health grant programs that also provide federal
financial assistance including health planning grants, loans and loan guarantees for hospitals and
other medical facilities, Maternal and Child Health grants, and Cripple Children Services grants.
See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1990).
More than 6,800 hospitals and 13,700 outpatient and primary care facilities receive federal financial assistance, primarily in the form of Medicaid and Medicare. See Mitchell F. Rice & Woodrow
Jones, Jr., PublicPolicy Compliance/Enforcementand Black American Health: Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in HEALTH CARE IssuES IN BLACK AMERICA 100 (1987).
The Rehabilitation Act applies to a wide range of federally funded activities, including not only
hospital and nursing homes that receive Medicaid and Medicare, but also public schools, private
colleges and universities, and state and local governments. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (Supp. 1991); 45
C.F.R. § 84, et seq. (1990). In fiscal year 1987, over seven hundred federal programs administered
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homes are prohibited from discriminating against a qualified individual
with a disability in the services they offer, their employment decisions,
and their methods of administration. Since almost every hospital and
nursing home employs at least twenty-five workers, they are also covered
by Title I, the employment provisions of the ADA.
Most physicians who treat patients in hospitals are not hospital employees but independent contractors who use the hospital's facilities.' 5 3
Although these physicians are not covered by the ADA's employment
provisions, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits hospitals that receive federal
financial assistance from discriminating in their decisions to grant, restrict or withdraw staff privileges.' 5 4
Many employees of private doctors, clinics and laboratories are also
protected by both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. If the office
accepts Medicaid, Medicare assignment or other federal funds, employees are covered by the Rehabilitation Act."' 5 If the office accepts no federal funds but has twenty-five or more employees, the employees are
covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act.5 6 If the office accepts
federal money and has at least twenty-five employees, both Acts apply.
B. AIDS as a ProtectedDisability
The individuals protected under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA are identical. Both protect persons with contagious diseases, including AIDS, from employment discrimination as long as the person
does not pose a significant risk to others. 5 7 The ADA's definition of a
person with a disability tracks the Rehabilitation Act's definition, and
the case law decided under the Rehabilitation Act also applies to the
58
ADA.1
1. Scope of Coverage In addition to people who are actually disabled, both acts protect individuals who were previously disabled and
those who are perceived as being disabled. The Rehabilitation Act and
by twenty-six federal agencies were subject to the Rehabilitation Act. See Sidney D. Watson, ReinvigoratingTitle V1. Defending Health CareDiscrimination-ItShouldn't Be So Easy, 28 FORDHAM
L. REv. 939, 944 (1990).
153. See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL.., AMERicAN HEALTH LAW 440-42 (1990).
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1991); 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1991).
155. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1990) and accompanying text supra note 12.
156. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1992) and accompanying text supra note 13.
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992); 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (Supp. 1991); 42
U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 199 2).
158. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, supra note 18, at 304-06.
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the ADA define an individual with a disability 5 9 as any person who: 1)

has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of the person's major life activities; 2) has a record of such an impairment; or 3) is regarded as having such an impairment." °
The first prong of the definition of a "disability" covers people who
because of a present disability are unable to engage in at least one major
life activity such as walking, seeing or working.1 61 The second prong
159. The Rehabilitation Act uses the term "individual with handicaps." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(Supp. 1991). The ADA refers to an individual with a "disability." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West
Supp. 1992). Handicap and disability are meant to have the same meanings under the two acts.
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, 55-56 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
337-38.
In 1986, Congress changed the term "handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act to "individual with handicaps." See Pub. L. 99-506, § 103(d)(2)(B), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986). Advocates
for the disabled urged Congress to change the terminology, fearing that "by retaining the adjective
'handicapped' before the noun 'person' the legislation might be inadvertently adding to the stereotype that persons with handicaps are less worthy." H.R. REP. No. 571, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 17
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3471, 3487. In the ADA Congress substituted the term
"individual with disabilities" for "individual with handicaps." Once again, advocates for the disabled urged Congress to change the terminology to avoid stereotyping. In 1991 advocates believed
that the term "disability" was less stigmatizing than "handicap." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. II, 29-33 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310-15.
160. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1992). The Rehabilitation Act provides that an individual with a handicap is "any person who 1) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, 2) has a
record of such an impairment, or 3) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1988). This definition was added to the Act in 1974. The original 1973 Act was concerned with increasing federal support for vocational rehabilitation and the Act's original definition
of handicap reflected this concern. It defined as handicapped only those persons whose disability

limited their employability and who could be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation.
Congress soon concluded, however, that this definition, while appropriate for the vocational rehabilitation provisions of the Act, was too narrow to deal with the range of discriminatory practices in
federal programs which stemmed from stereotypical attitudes and ignorance. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 39 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388-90, 6413-14.
The ADA provides that "[tihe term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1992).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1982) (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp.
1992) (ADA). Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's implementing regulations define physical
or mental "handicap" and "disability" to include a wide range of impairments-mobility, vision and
hearing impairments, all types of physical diseases, drug and alcohol addiction, and mental
impairments:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
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includes not only persons who have a history of, but who have been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities. 162 The third prong covers: (1)
those who have a physical or mental impairment that does not substan45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)(2) (1991).
Both acts' implementing regulations define "major life activities" through a non-exclusive illustrative list which includes a wide range of functions including walking, breathing, learning and
working, and caring for one's self. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1986) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)

(1991).
The Rehabilitation Act regulations do not define "substantial limitation." The Department of
Health and Human Services has explained this gap by stating that it does not believe that a definition
of the term "substantial limitation" is possible. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A at 325 (1986). But see Toni
M. Massaro, Employment Rights ofHandicappedIndivduak Statutoryand JudicialParameters,20
WM. & MARY L. Ruv. 291, 291-94 (1978) (criticizing the Department of Health and Human Service's position).
However, the ADA regulations do define "substantially limits":
(j) Substantially limits-(1) The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(ii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particularjob does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
(ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the following
factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited
in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types ofjobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills
or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1991).
162. Both the Rehabilitation Act and ADA regulations define "has a history of such impairment" as meaning, "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical im-
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tially limit a major life activity, but who are treated as having such a
limitation;16 3 (2) those who have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major activities only because of the attitudes of others
toward the impairments; and (3) those who have no physical or mental
impairment but who are treated as having one. 16 4
The fact that an individual presently has a disability, had a disability
or is perceived as disabled establishes the basic coverage for that person
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 6 In each case, however,
the person must also be "otherwise qualified" for the particular position,
service or benefit involved. 66 This means that the person must be able to
perform the essential functions of the job,16 7 meet all the routine requirepairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j(2)(iii)
(1990) (Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1991) (ADA).
163. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA regulations broadly define "is regarded as having an
impairment" to mean:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities, but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C)has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section, but is treated as having such an
impairment.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1990); 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(1) (1991).
164. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(B) (1990); 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(1)(2) (1991).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1990); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1630.2(g), 1630.2(j) and 1630.2(k) (1991).
166. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1992) (ADA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (8) (West Supp. 1991)
(Rehabilitation Act). The Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section 706 (8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1992). The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1992).
167. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(2)(k)(1) (1986) (Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1991)
(ADA).
In drafting the Rehabilitation Act regulations, the Department of Health and Human Services
chose the term "essential functions" to emphasize that persons with a disability are not disqualified
from employment if they are unable to perform only tasks that are ancillary to the job in question.
45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A at 327. HHS explained that the term "otherwise qualified" refers to an
individual who is qualified except for their handicap, rather than "in spite" of it. 56 Fed. Reg.
35,735 (1991). See Janet H. Leader, Comment, Runningfrom FearItsel.
Analyzing Employment
DiscriminationAgainst Persons with AIDS and Other Communicable Diseases Under Section 504 of
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168
ments of the program,
and must not pose a safety risk to others in the
169

work environment.

the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 857 (1987) (comprehensive analysis of the
"otherwise qualified" standard).
The ADA implementing regulations provide greater detail on what constitutes an "essential" job
function.
(n) Essentialfunctions-(1) In general The term essentialfunctions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or
desires. The term "essential functions" does not include the marginal functions of the
position.
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including, but
not limited to the following:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform
that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available
among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed, and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is
hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.
(3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for
the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n) (1991).
168. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 406 (1979) (plaintiff is
otherwise qualified if she can demonstrate that she is "able to meet all of a program's requirements in
spite of [her] handicap."); S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390 ("adjective 'qualified' in modification of 'handicapped individual'.., requires that the 'employability' of the handicapped individual in question is a prerequisite" to Act's
application); H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, 1, 55-57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 337-39 ("qualified individual with a disability" is an "individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that the individual holds and desires at the time of the job action.").
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c)(x) (excluding from the Rehabilitation Act's employment protections disabled alcoholics and drug addicts whose current use of alcohol or drugs pose a direct threat
to the property or to the safety of others); and 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (excluding from the Rehabilitation Act's employment protections individuals with contagious disease who are a direct threat to the
health or safety of others); and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1991) (noting that a person posing a direct
threat of significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation are excluded from the ADA's protection.); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1991) (noting that
also outside the ADA are those who are currently engaging in illegal use of drugs).
See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.16 ("A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an
infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if
reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk."); and Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 409 (in implementing the mandate of section 504, the courts must ensure the
safety of third parties). See also Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, (5th Cir. 1991); Wynne
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If a reasonable accommodation would enable the person to meet
these requirements, the employer has an affirmative duty to make that
accommodation.17 0 An accommodation is reasonable if it does not imv. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991); Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1987); Carter v. Casa Ctr., 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988).
In 1978, Congress narrowed the Rehabilitation Act's definition of an individual with a handicap
for purposes of employment discrimination only. Congress excluded from the Act's protection alcoholics and drug addicts whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevent them from performing their
jobs or who pose a direct threat to the property or to the safety of others. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)
(1976 and Supp. 1981). This amendment resulted from HHS's interpretation that the statutory definition of "handicapped individual" included alcoholics and drug addicts and the business community's subsequent outcry of concern over safety in the workplace. See Evelynn M. Gentemann, After
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline: Employees with AIDS and the Concerns of the "Worried
Well," 37 AM. U. L. REv. 867, 879 n.28 (1988).
Whether risk to self is a valid consideration under the Rehabilitation Act is not yet settled. Such
risk is not sufficient under Title VII to exclude a protected worker. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 335 (1977). However, the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit so far to address the issue, has
held that risk to self is a valid consideration under the Rehabilitation Act. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767
F.2d 1416, 1423, 1425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). See also, Bentivegna v. United States Dept. of Labor, 694
F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D.Haw. 1980); Bey v.
Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Penn 1982); Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.I. 1984).
The ADA implementing regulations do consider significant risk of substantial harm to the individual a valid issue in determining the qualifications for a job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991). However, Congress made clear that the determination of whether individuals pose a direct threat of harm
to themselves must follow an individualized assessment based on a reasonable medical judgment
relying on the most current medical knowledge and objective evidence available; not an employer's
subjective determination nor a categorical determination. H. R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. II, 1, 45-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 273, 358-60; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
Congress has also determined that all pertinent case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act's "significant risk" standard shall apply to implementation of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a)(b) (West
Supp. 1992).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1991); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)(b)(5)(4)
(West Supp. 1992).
Under the ADA, an employer must make reasonable accommodations or be held in violation of
the statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
(o) Reasonable accommodation (1) The term reasonable accommodation means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires;
or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a
qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position;
or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
(2) Reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to:
i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(ii) Job restructuring: part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant
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pose "undue financial and administrative burdens" or "require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.""17 Although not
explicitly stated, the reasonable accommodation requirement obligates
employers to bear the greater risks posed by those with disabilities and
the higher health care costs associated with individuals with
disabilities. 7 2
The Arline Decision and its Impac In 1973, when the Rehabil73
itation Act was first enacted, it made no mention of contagious diseases as disabilities, and AIDS was unheard of. After the first cases of
AIDS were reported, some controversy existed about whether persons
2.

with contagious diseases, including both asymptomatic HIV infection
and AIDS, are disabled for purposes of Section 504. The controversy
position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
(3) To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the
covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual
with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise
limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that
could overcome those limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1991).
171. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 410, 412-13 (reasonable accommodation
does not require recipients of federal funds to make accommodations that impose undue financial
and administrative burdens or to take actions that will radically restructure the employment or
lower the employment standards). See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 (1985) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act does not require "fundamental" or "substantial" modification in
business operations, but imposes burden of making a "reasonable accommodation" for the person's
disability).
An accommodation is not reasonable if it would impose an "undue hardship" on the recipient.
The regulations define "undue hardship" by evaluating the size of the program, with respect to
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1991); 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111(10) (West Supp. 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1991).
172. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986) ("Congress
apparently determined that it would require... grantees to bear the costs of providing employment
for the handicapped.") (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984)).
See Rosalie K. Murphy, ReasonableAccommodation andEmployment DiscriminationUnder Title I
ofthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64 So. CAL- L. REv. 1607 (1991) for a comparison of reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
173. Use of the terms "contagious," "communicable," and "infectious" may be confusing and is
frequently misleading. Although sometimes used synonymously, these words vary in meaning.
Whereas the terms "communicable" or "infectious" are generally used to refer to a disease that
potentially can be transmitted to others, the term "contagious" refers to a current capacity to transmit the disease. Thus, although a person may have a "communicable" disease, she may not currently be "contagious." Gentemann, supranote 169 at 874 n.16 (citing DoRsL1ND's ILLUSMATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 293, 301, 664 (28th ed. 1981)).
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began in 1986 when the United States Department of Justice concluded,

counterintuitively, that although the debilitating effects of a contagious
disease like AIDS might constitute a disability, the person's real or per-

ceived ability to transmit the disease to others did not constitute a disability.174 Thus, according to the Justice Department's analysis,
discrimination based on a real or even unfounded fear of contagion was

not prohibited by section 504.115

However, in 1987 in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,176 the
Supreme Court expressly and properly rejected the Justice Department's

position, holding instead that an individual afflicted with a contagious
disease could be disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act if any
one of the three prongs of the definition of a handicap were met. 17 7 The

Court noted that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability
and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise '17
to8the same
level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness."

While the Supreme Court has not addressed whether HIV infection
is a protected disability, lower courts, 17 9 scholars1 80 and Congress 8"
174. See Baxely, supra note 113, at 25 (citing 9A Fair Emp. Man. (BNA), at 3001).
175. !L
176. Arline, 480 U.S. at 273.
177. Id at 284-86. In Arline the plaintiff, Gene Arline, an elementary school teacher, was hospitalized for tuberculosis in 1957. After twenty years of remission the tuberculous became active and
contagious again in 1977 and 1978, causing the local school board to fire her because of the alleged
health risk she posed to her students. Id at 276. The Court held that Gene Arline was an individual
with a handicap because her hospitalization in 1957 constituted a "record of... impairment." Id. at
281.
178. Id. at 284.
179. Ray v. School Dist. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (asymptomatic carriers of the AIDS virus are handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act);
District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (Sup.
Ct. 1986) (Rehabilitation Act covers asymptomatic HIV carriers because they "ha[ve] a history of,
or ha[ve] been misclassified as having an impairment.") (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.3[f][2][ili] (1991));
Doe v. Centinela Hosp. Found., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal., June 30, 1988) (HIV-infected plaintiff
was covered because he was perceived as having an impairment which substantially limited a major
life activity). See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 708-10 (9th Cir. 1988); Martinez
v. School Bd.of Hillsborough County, Fla., 861 F.2d 1502, 1504-05 (1lth Cir. 1988); Shuttleworth
v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 656-58 (S.D. Fla. 1986). See also Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("Even those who are asymptomatic have
abnormalities in their heric and reproductive systems making procreation and childbirth dangerous
to themselves and others."); and Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (district judge agreed with parties
that asymptomatic HIV infection constituted a handicap, noting that HIV infection could be both a
physical impairment to the immune system that substantially limited a major life activity and could
be perceived as such an impairment).
180. See, eg., Arthur S.Leonard, AIDS andEmployment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.
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agree that both asymptomatic HIV infection and AIDS are disabling
conditions for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Some
consider both asymptomatic HIV infection and AIDS to fall within the
first prong of the definition of a disabling condition because it may substantially limit the major life activities of sex, procreation or fighting off
11, 27 (1985); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discriminationunder Federa State and Local Law
After Arline, 15 FLA.ST. U.L. REV. 221, 240 (1987); Gregory M. Shumaker, Note, AIDS: Does It
Qualify as a "Handicap"Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 572, 586
(1986); Terry L. Pabst, Note, Protection of AIDS Victims From Employment Discrimination Under
the RehabilitationAct, 1987 U. ILL. L. REy. 355, 368-70; Leader, supra note 167, at 895-96; Arthur
S. Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS & THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 109, 112
(Harlon Dalton & Scott Burris eds. 1987); Arthur S. Leonard, Employment DiscriminationAgainst
Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681, 696 (1985); Judith P. Vladeck, IsAIDS a Disability?
32 PRAc.LAW. 13, 17 (Sept. 1986); Stephen Sherman, Note, An IndividualizedDefinition ofHandicap and Its Application to HIV, 22 U. CAL. DAVIS 653, 677-79 (1989); but see Gary Lawson, AIDS
Astrology, and Arline" Towards a CausalInterpretationof Section 504, 17 HoFsTRA L. REV. 237,
275-98 (1989).
181. Debate on the 1987 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act makes clear that members of
Congress assumed that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infection were handicaps under
the Rehabilitation Act. See 134 CoNG. REC. H575 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Owens); 134 CONG. REc. H574 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("Section 504
and the decisions that have addressed infectious diseases - such as Arline, AFGE v. State, Thomas v.
Atascadero, and Ray v. Desoto - have made it clear that people with AIDS and HIV infections are
protected ....");see also 134 CONG. REc. H579-80 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Dannemeyer) (opposing amendment because it covered asymptomatic individuals).
The ADA incorporates the Rehabilitation Act's definition of an individual with a handicap. 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West Supp. 1992). H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, 1 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337. In floor debate on the ADA, members of Congress agreed
that Section 504, and through parallelism the ADA, covered people with HIV infection and AIDS.
See, eg., 136 CONG. REC. H2422 (Rep. Dannemeyer) (opposing bill because "every HIV carrier in
the country immediately comes within the definition of a disabled person); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES REP., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 22,24 (explaining why a person with
HIV infection is covered by the ADA's definition of disability); 135 CONG. REc. S10,722 (Sept. 7,
1989) (Sen. Cranston) ("This bill covers individuals with AIDS and individuals who are infected
with the HIV virus."); Id at SlO, 789 (Sen. Kennedy) ("barring discrimination based on HIV infection"); Id at S10,794 (Sen. Moynihan) (noting that "[a]mong the disabled individuals afforded protections under this bill are people with a diagnosis of HIV infection.") Ia at S10,800 (Sen. Simon)
(noting that the bill "will extend protection to people with AIDS and people infected with HIV.").
The Justice Department has also determined that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV are a
disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. Justice Department Memorandum on Application
of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, released September 27, 1988, reprinted
in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 195 at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988). The 1988 Memorandum reversed the Justice
Department's previous position that the Act protected only symptomatic carriers of the AIDS virus.
Gail Bass, Note, Expanding the Protection of AIDS Victims Under the FederalRehabilitationAct:
Unifying the Views of Courtsand the Departmentof Justice, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 627, 627 (1989). For
a discussion of the analysis used by the Justice Department in determining that the Rehabilitation
Act's ban on handicap discrimination reaches both symptomatic and asymptomatic AIDS, see id) at
634-36.
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infections.182 Others argue that asymptomatic people infected with the
HIV virus can also be covered under the third prong of the definition if
they are regarded as unable to work or engage in other major life activities.183 This alternative analysis also protects individuals, like caregivers
of people with AIDS and homosexuals, who are not HIV infected themselves, but are regarded as being infected.
While being HIV infected establishes that a person is an individual
with a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, a
person disabled by a contagious disease still must be otherwise qualified
to hold the particular job or participate in the specific program at issue.
The Arline court held that a person would not be otherwise qualified for
a job if that person posed a significant risk of communicating an infec-

tious disease to others in the workplace and if that risk could not be
eliminated through reasonable accommodation."' Both the Rehabiita182. See, eg., Robert A. Kushen, Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus asa Handicap Under the RehabilitationAct of1973, 88 COLUM. L. Rv. 563, 573-74 (1988) (major life activity
of employment); Pabst, supra note 180, at 370; Leader, supranote 167, at 895-96 (major life activity
of working); but see, Mary Landolt, Are AIDS Victims Handicapped?,31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 729, 741
(1987) (arguing that mere carriers of HMV or persons in the early stages of the disease usually exhibit
no disabling effects and therefore do not have a handicap).
183. See, eg., Leonard, supra note 180, at 27; Wasson, supra note 180, at 240; Gentemann,
supra note 169; Shumaker, supranote 180, at 586; Lisa J. Sotto, Comment, Undoinga Lesson ofFear
in the Classroom: The Legal Recourse ofAIDS-Linked Children, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 193, 201-02
(1987); Sherman, supra note 180, at 687-88.
184. Arline, 480 U.S. 287. Although the Court inArline did not cite any authority for its choice
of the "significant risk" standard, lower courts had used this standard to assess risk to others in cases
involving both contagious and noncontagious handicapping conditions. See Mantolete v. Bolger,
767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (demanding proof of "reasonable probability of substantial
harm"); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1983) (requiring evidence of
"appreciable risk" of harm to others); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981)(requiring proof of "significant" or "appreciable" risk of harm); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 466 F.Supp. 479, 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that mentally retarded children
who were carriers of hepatitis could not be excluded from school system because of school's failure
to provide evidence of "substantial" health risk), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979); Bey v. Bolger,
540 F.Supp. 910, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding a "substantial likelihood" that plaintiff could suffer
further damage from a heart attack, stroke or end organ damage if he were reinstated to his position
as a postal clerk).
The Court was unable to resolve whether Ms. Arline posed a significant risk to others because the
District Court had made no findings about the duration of Ms. Arline's tuberculosis, its severity, or
the probability that she would transmit the disease. Id. at 288. Neither did the lower court determine if Gene Arline was in fact contagious at the time she was fired or if the local school board could
have reasonably accommodated her. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court to determine if Gene Arline was otherwise qualified for the position, a
determination that necessarily entailed a determination of whether she posed a significant risk to
others. Id. at 289.
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tion Act and the ADA have codified Arline's holding' 8 5
In 1987 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a
handicap in the employment setting to provide that persons with a "contagious disease or infection" that fulfills one prong of the Act's definition
of handicapped are protected as long as they do not pose "a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals" which cannot be reduced
through a reasonable accommodation."8 6 The statutory language "direct
threat" is meant to codify the standard of "significant risk" articulated in
17
Arline.
The ADA provides that employers may require that all employees,
not just those with contagious diseases, not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.' 8 The ADA defines "direct threat" as a "significant risk to the health and safety of
185. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(d) (1985) (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(8)-12111(10),
12112 (West Supp. 1992) (ADA).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8Xd) (Supp. 1992). The provision states:
[Flor the purpose of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections related to employment such term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or
infection and show, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of such disease or
infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
Id.
The language of the amendment is analytically inaccurate to the extent that it excludes those with
contagious diseases from the definition of an individual with a handicap. Congress intended the
amendment to codify that persons with contagious diseases are covered by the Act if they are "otherwise qualified" because they do not pose a health or safety risk. 134 CONG. REc. H567 (daily ed.
Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (stating that the amendment codifies the existing "otherwise qualified" standard of section 504 of section 504); 124 CONG. REC. H573 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss) (stating that individuals who pose a health risk are not "otherwise
qualified" to remain in the particular position).
187. 134 CONG. REc. H574 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Owens) (stating that
although it served some useful practical purposes, the amendment was essentially unnecessary); 134
CONG. REc.H575 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (finding that the amendment made no substantive changes in the law); 134 CONG. REC. H567 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Hawkins) (stating that amendment codifies the existing "otherwise qualified"
standard of the Rehabilitation Act); 134 CONG. REC. H573 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Weiss) (stating that individuals who pose a health risk are not "otherwise qualified" to remain
in the particular position).
The practical purpose of the amendment was to pacify the misplaced fears of employers who
thought that they would be forced to hire or retain all individuals with contagious diseases regardless
of the health risks involved. See 134 CONG. REc. H573 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Weiss); 134 CONG. REc. H584 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("The HarkinHumphrey Amendment is necessary solely to allay the fears of some employers who have misinterpreted the Arline decision ....
") 134 CONG. REC. S1738, (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Harkin). For a detailed discussion of the Congressional debate and development of the amendment,
see Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment, 49 OHIO S. L. J. 929, 936-38 (1989).
188. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommoda-

tion",189 and legislative history cites Arline as determining what constitutes a significant risk.1 "° Although their language differs slightly,
Arline, the Rehabilitation Act amendment, and the recently enacted

ADA all impose the same requirement on employers: they may not discriminate against health care workers with contagious diseases as long as

the workers do not pose a significant risk to others which cannot be reduced sufficiently through a reasonable accommodation.
The Rehabilitation Act' 9 ' and the ADA 192 are intended to protect
people with disabilities, not only from simple prejudice but also from
"archaic attitudes" and from "the fact that many American people are

simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." 193 Few disabilities give rise to the same level
of public fear and misapprehension as do contagious diseases.1 94 Stereo-

types, generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies about contagious diseases
abound. 195 The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are designed to replace
these reflexive, prejudiced reactions with ones based on reasoned and
medically sound judgments.' 96 Thus, a determination that an individual

with a contagious disease poses a significant risk requires an individualized inquiry and factual findings "based on reasonable medical judgThe term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b) (West Supp. 1992).
The ADA specifically extends the risk to others concept beyond contagious diseases to any person
with a disability. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
189. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(3) (West Supp. 1992); see also Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,736 (1991)
(to be codified at C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r)).
190. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. II, at 45-46 (1990), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N 267, 468-69; "The standard to be used in determining whether there is a direct threat
is whether the person poses a significant risk to the safety of others or to property, not a speculative
or remote risk, and that no reasonable accommodation is available that can remove the risk." (see
Section 102(b) of the legislation); see also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987). S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Seas. 27 (1989). "[F]or a person with a currently contagious disease or infection to constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of others, the person
must pose a significant risk of transmitting the infection to others in the workplace which cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id. at 40.
191. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795(i) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
192. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
193. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (quoting S. RP. No. 129,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1974)); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b) (West Supp. 1992).
194. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
195. Id at 287; S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).
196. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-85.

1992]

ELIMINATING FEAR

ments given the state of medical knowledge" ' 197 as to four factors:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration
of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk
(what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities
198 the

disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.

The four-part factual inquiry into the nature of the disease prevents

broad, inaccurate generalizations about communicable diseases or the
contagiousness of persons suffering from them. There are presently over
200 communicable diseases. 19 9 They range from the common cold, to

polio, rubella, tuberculosis, hepatitis and AIDS."°

These diseases vary

greatly not only in their severity, but also in their method of transmission
and their contagiousness. 20 '
This four-part factual inquiry requires a
court to determine not only the probability that a disease will be transmitted, but the degree of harm to others that will result if the disease is

transmitted.
Not only must a court evaluate the specific contagious disease, but it
must also examine the individual, the job and the individual's behavior to
determine what level of risk that individual poses to others.2 "2 The deter-

mination that a particular individual with a disability poses a significant
risk to others must be case specific. 2 "3 Each determination requires an
individualized factual inquiry into the nature of the disease and the risk
197. Id. at 288 (1987) (citing Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at

19).
198. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. II, at 56-57, 73-75 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 267, 338-39, 355-58;
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. H, at 45-46 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 468-69.
The ADA regulations incorporate Arline's four part test by requiring consideration of: "(1) The
duration of the risk, (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the
potential harm will occur;, and (4) The imminence of the potential harm." Regulations to Implement
the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734,
35,745 (1991) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(r)).
199. See CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE IN MAN (A. Benenson ed., 14th ed. 1985)
[hereinafter COMMUNICABLE DISEASE]; see generally GERALD L. MANDELL, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1990).
200. See generally MANDELL, supra note 199.
201. CHURCHILL'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 939 (1989); COMMUNICABLE DISEASE, supra note
199, at 412; see generally MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY (15th ed. 1987).
202. See, eg., Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) ("These
determinations require a fact-specific individualized inquiry resulting in a 'well-informed judgment
grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives.' ") (quoting Arline v.
School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (1lth Cir. 1985)). See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416,
1420-22 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 1517 (9th Cir. 1985); Strathie v.
Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 229-31 (3d Cir. 1983).
203. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987); S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27
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the particular individual poses. 204
A court, under the Arline analysis, must determine what, if any, risk
of transmission arises within the context of the particular job. The court

may not rely upon generalizations about people's work habits.2"5 It must
evaluate the individual's work history, medical history and job description to determine whether the job and the individual's specific circumstances pose a significant risk.'
To avoid decisions founded on prejudice and fear, the Court in Ar-

line specifically directed courts normally to rely on the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials when making factual findings
about the nature, degree and duration of the risk posed by a specific individual with a contagious disease.2 0 7 A medical judgment is "reasonable"
(1989); Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,726 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
204. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88; H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. II, at 45-46
(1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 468-69; Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,745 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). The court must examine the factual record to ascertain whether
the employer properly evaluated the risk posed by the disabled person or whether the employer's
decision was based upon unsubstantiated assumptions and misinformation. In requiring a factual
basis for the significant risk determination the court, sub silentio, resolved a spit among the lower
courts regarding the standard of review for an employer's job qualification. Some lower courts had
used a "substantial justification test" deferring to the reasonable decisions of the employer if the
decision was supported by a "sound, thorough record." Other courts employed a "factual basis test"
in which the court examined the factual record to determine whether the employer's decision was
legitimate or relied upon unsubstantiated assumptions or insufficient factual grounds. See
Gentemann, supra note 169, at 907-09.
205. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985). A determination of the
reasonable probability of substantial harm "cannot be made based merely on an employer's subjective evaluation or... merely on medical reports. The question is whether, in light of the individual's
work history and medical history, employment of that individual would pose a reasonable
probability of substantial harm." Id.
206. Id. For example, an employer may not assume that a mentally ill person poses a significant
risk to others; to do so would constitute an assumption based on fear and stereotype. Rather, any
decision to exclude such a person from ajob requires objective evidence that the person has a recent
history of committing overt acts or making threats that caused or directly threatened harm. H. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd. Sess., pt. II, at 45-46 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 46869.
207. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Court specifically refused to address what deference, if any,
courts should give to the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians. "This case does not
present, and we do not address, the question whether courts should also defer to the reasonable
medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has relied." Id. at 288 n. 18.
Neither did the Court indicate what deference should be given to the positions of professional
associations, like the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association, that
are concerned as much about the professional stature of their members as with the public's health.
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANsroRMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 420-49 (1982) (dis-

cussing the role of professional medical organizations).
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if it is based on scientific data and is within a medically acceptable range
of professional judgments."' Within the medical community, public
health officials are best suited to evaluate the risks posed by communicable disease because they are specifically trained to make these determinations. Courts have generally deferred to the advice of public health
experts about the risks posed by communicable diseases. 2°9
Courts should defer to public health officials in making factual findings about the nature, degree and duration of the risk posed by a contagious disease and a specific individual. However, whether the person

presents a "significant risk" to others that cannot be reduced by a reasonable accommodation is ultimately a legal judgment requiring the court to
balance the interests protected by disability discrimination statutes
against society's interest in avoiding unnecessary exposure to contagious
diseases. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's four-part factual analy-

sis seek to create a factual basis for the determination of "significant"
risk.
III.

CALCULATING SIGNIFICANT RISK: THE NECESSITY FOR A
COMPARATIVE RISK APPROACH

The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA seek to integrate people with
208. Thus, litigants must present courts with evidence which forms the basis of a medical opinion to permit a determination of whether the opinion is one which is within the range of professional
judgments. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
209. See Gentemann, supra note 169, at n.178. The Court's placing of the responsibility of
assessing risk in the hands of the medical and scientific communities is not a novel action. See, eg.,
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979) ("The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges. What is best for a child is an individual medical decision that
must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case."). Cf.Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,429
(1979) (determining that commitment of mentally ill depends "on the meaning of the facts which
must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists"). See Gentemann, supra, at n.178
(citing Michael S. Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens from
Communicable Disease, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 537, 544-46 (1978) (outlining federal involvement in
control of communicable diseases)); Scott Burris, Note, FearItself:
AIDS, Herpes and Public Health
Decisions,3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV.479,481-83 (surveying public health role and legal standards for
reviewing public health decisions); Note, ConstitutionalRights ofAIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. Rv.
1274, 1276-78 (1986) (reviewing public health policy and decision-making in light of AIDS epidemic).
However, Arline does not require courts to give decisive weight to public health officials' opinions.
See Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 938-39 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 892
(1989) (noting that "we do not read Arline as requiring courts to give decisive weight to any public
health official's testimony simply by virtue of his position. The official must have particular knowledge relevant to the issue in question .... In deciding section 504 cases, courts may be called upon
to balance deference to health authorities with the deference due to the reasonable judgments of the
administrators most familiar with the program under examination.").
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disabilities into the workplace-even though most people with disabilities create some heightened risk. The significant risk standard in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA represent a congressional decision that
some risk is tolerable. The difficult legal issue is determining when some
risk amounts to a "significant" risk.
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act define a significant risk as one
that is more than "theoretical," '2 10 "remote,"21 1 "potential,"2'12 "speculative ' or "merely an elevated risk."2 4 To be significant a risk must be
"appreciable" or "substantial ' 21 5 and it must create a significant risk of
substantial harm. 2 16 While the significant risk standard protects legitimate and important concerns about workplace safety, it does not guaran-

tee the highest degree of safety.217
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's requirement of a high
probability of substantial harm strikes a balance which seeks to include
210. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708-09; Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, Fla., 861 F.2d
1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
211. New York State Ass'n For Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir.
1979); Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708; S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sees. 27 ("speculative or remote
risk" that no reasonable accommodation can remove) (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 289). In Carey, the
Second Circuit prohibited a local school board from excluding from regular class rooms mentally
retarded children who were thought to be carriers of hepatitis. Evidence presented in the case
showed that hepatitis B is transmitted by blood-to-blood routes, and that there was no definite proof
that the disease was communicated by other routes such as saliva. The Court held that even if the
virus could be transmitted through saliva, the activities that occur in classroom settings posed only a
"remote possibility of transmission" and did not rise to a "significant" level. 612 F.2d at 650.
212. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d at 227, 232 (3rd Cir. 1983).
213. S. REP.No. 116, 101st Cong., IstSess. 27 ("speculative or remote risk" that no reasonable
accommodation can remove) (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 289).
214. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 38 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1517 (9th Cir. 1985).
215. Lower courts have used the term "significant" risk interchangeably with "reasonable
probability of substantial harm," "substantial likelihood" of harm and "genuine substantial risk" of
harm to indicate the relatively high quantum of possibility of harm that must exist before the risk
will be significant enough to exclude a handicapped worker. See Chiari v. City of League City, 920
F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991) (significant risk is a "genuine substantial risk"); Mantolete v. Bolger,
767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1517 (9th Cir. 1985)
(demanding proof of "reasonable probability of substantial harm"); Strathie v. Department of
Transp. 716 F.2d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1983) (requiring evidence of "appreciable risk" of harm to
others); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761,777 (2d Cir. 1981) (requiring proof of "significant" or
"appreciable" risk of harm); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F.Supp. 479, 486
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that mentally retarded children who were carriers of hepatitis could not be
excluded from school system because of school's failure to provide evidence of "significant" health
risk), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F.Supp 910, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting
that there was a "substantial likelihood" that plaintiff could suffer further damage from a heart
attack, stroke or end organ damage if he were reinstated to his position as a postal clerk).
216. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
217. See, eg., Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707.

19921

ELIMINATING FEAR

787

in the mainstream of society people with contagious diseases. Some people with contagious diseases-like many people disabled and not-present a heightened risk to others. The significant risk of substantial harm
standard dictates that some risk is tolerable because the world and the
workplace, by their very natures as human endeavors, are not risk free.
It is only when the level of risk becomes significant that a person with a
contagious disease may be excluded from the workplace.2 1
Arline's
four-part factual inquiry commands courts to base risk calculations on
scientific and medical data rather than on stereotypes or fear.
A.

Caselaw Involving AIDS in Schools: Easy Cases

The cases involving school children with AIDS present relatively
easy occasions for application of the significant risk standard. They offer
instructive examples of careful application of Arline's four-part factual
analysis. Once the courts collected the medical and scientific data, and
scrutinized the basis for the public health opinions, they had little difficulty in finding that HIV infected teachers and children did not cross
Airline's significant risk threshold: the teachers and the school children
presented no real risk of exposure to blood, semen or vaginal fluids-the
routes of HIV transmission.
In Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent Dist. of California,2 9 for
example, a school district sought to exclude a teacher from the classroom
because he had AIDS.220 Despite overwhelming evidence that AIDS
could not be transmitted through the close, non-sexual contact that occurs in the ordinary school setting, one doctor testified without scientific
support that there was a small probability that unknown methods of
transmission existed. 22 ' Relying on this testimony and the fact that the
virus is found in saliva as well as other body fluids like tears and urine,
the district court found a significant risk of transmission in the school
setting.2 2 2 The court reasoned that not enough was known about AIDS
to be "completely certain" that AIDS could not be transmitted through
casual contact.2 23 . The Ninth Circuit appropriately reversed, noting that
218. See Bentivegna v. United States Dept. of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[Allowing remote concerns to legitimate discrimination against the handicapped would vitiate the
effectiveness of section 504 of the Act. Potentially troublesome health problems will affect a large
proportion of the handicapped population.").
219. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
220. Id at 703.
221. Id. at 706-08.
222. Id.
223. Id
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"[ilittle in science can be proved with complete certainty, and section 504
does not require such a test."'2 24 The court noted that it was error for the
district court to require that every theoretical possibility of harm be disproved.2 25 The Ninth Circuit concluded that even though the duration
of the risk is "long" and the severity of the risk is "catastrophic," the
school district's concerns amounted to only a "remote, theoretical possibility of harm" and not a significant risk.22 6
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County, Fla.,2 refused to isolate from the rest of her class a
retarded child who had AIDS. Eliana Martinez was seven years old, had
an IQ of 41, was not toilet trained, and sucked her thumb and forefinger
which were frequently covered with saliva. She suffered from thrush, a
disease that can cause blood in the saliva.22 8 The district court, finding
that there was a "remote theoretical possibility of transmission" of the
HIV virus through tears, saliva and urine, permitted her isolation.2 29
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that any such remote possibility
did not satisfy the Rehabilitation Act's significant risk standard.2"'
B. Hard Cases: The Deficiency of Numbers Alone
Some situations, like the school children cases, present only a remote, insignificant risk. Others just as starkly present a significant risk of
substantial harm. For example, a 90% chance, or even a 50% chance,
that a disease will be transmitted and cause death certainly creates a significant risk. 23 1 However, the close questions arise as percentages drop.
224. Id. at 707. See also Carter v. Casa Ctr., 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988), in which the
director of nursing at a nursing home was discharged after being diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. The employer claimed that the nurse's inability to walk or stand for prolonged periods of time

was a possible hazard to the health of patients and other employees. The court noted that "the
record is bereft of any evidence that Carter's handicap posed any risk of harm to anyone, much less a
significant risk. It is precisely this type of uninformed generalization based upon stereotypes and

prejudices which the Rehabilitation Act is designed to counteract." Id. at 1055.
225. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 709.
226. Id. at 705.
227. 861 F.2d 1502 (1lth Cir. 1988).
228. Id. at 1503.
229. Id. at 1504.
230. Id. at 1506. The court remanded the case because the court below had failed to make any
finding with regard to the risk of transmission from blood in the saliva to which other children might

be exposed. Id.
231. See E. E.Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D.Haw. 1980); see also Doe v.
New York Univ., 666 F.2d 767, 777 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that with regard to an applicant with
history of suicide attempts, "[iut would be unreasonable to infer that Congress intended to force

institutions to accept or admit persons who pose a significant risk of harm to themselves or others,
even if the chances of harm were less than 50%.").
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Is a 5% risk of transmission and death significant? A 1% chance? A

.3% chance?
As the percentages decrease the analytical difficulty increases in inverse proportion: How should courts distinguish between remote or
merely elevated risks on the one hand, and those that are significant and
substantial, on the other? The verbal formulae work well enough in the
easy cases. However, alone, without a reference point, they do not answer the difficult cases, like those involving health care workers who are
HIV positive.
The Arline Court's four-part factual inquiry into the duration of the
risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the
potential harm will occur and the imminence of the potential harm delineates the relevant factors in determining significant risk.232 However, in
the closer cases the identification of the probability of transmission and
severity of the consequences is not alone sufficient data upon which to
determine whether a risk is significant. The underlying difficulty is that
raw numbers and percentages alone cannot assess the severity of the risk
and distinguish between significant and remote risks.
Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr. 233 illustrates the problematic nature of relying on quantification alone. In Kohl, the court addressed a
challenge to the refusal of a residential rehabilitation facility for the mentally retarded to admit Dennis Kohl because he was a hepatitis B carrier.
The issue before the court was whether reasonable accommodation to
eliminate significant risk required the inoculation of all Woodhaven staff
or, alternatively, if significant risk existed, whether it could be sufficiently
eliminated by inoculating only those who reasonably could come into
contact with Kohl. 34
Dennis Kohl frequently engaged in acts of aggression, including
scratching and biting the staff and himself; these acts could transmit the
hepatitis B virus which is spread by blood to blood contact.2 35 A single
exposure to Kohl's form of the hepatitis B virus created a 10 to 15%
chance that an unimmunized individual would contract the disease.23 6
232. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. II, supra
note 18, at 56-57; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
233. 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 892 (1989).
234. Id. at 932-33.
235. Id. at 933. Dennis Kohl was thirty-two years old, mentally retarded and bilaterally blind.
His physical and mental impairments caused his maladaptive behavior. Id. at 932.
236. Id at 933. Hepatitis carriers are not uniformly infectious. A carrier who is e antigen
positive is three to four times more infectious than an e antigen negative carrier. The risk of transmission with an e antigen negative carrier like Dennis Kohl is 10-15% while the risk with an e
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Post-exposure treatment, however, could prevent infection 75% of the
time, reducing the real risk of transmission to 2.5%.237 Although the
most common symptoms of hepatitis are inflammation of the liver and
mild flu-like illness, 5% do die from liver failure caused by the disease. 23"
The Eighth Circuit panel disagreed on whether Dennis Kohl
presented a significant risk of substantial harm to others.2 39 Both the
majority and dissent used the same data and correctly analyzed it; they
simply emphasized different figures. According to the majority, the important figure was that one out of four workers-25% of those who
might be exposed to the hepatitis virus-could not be prevented from
contracting the virus by post-exposure treatment. 24° The dissent, on the
other hand, found dispositive the fact that the risk to any one staff member of becoming infected was only 2.5% and the risk of death upon infection a mere .125%.241
The weakness in both conclusions is not which figures they chose to
emphasize, but the absence of any baseline against which to measure sigantigen positive carrier is 30%. Carriers can change from positive to negative status, and carriers
can lose their infectiousness entirely. Id.
237. Id at 933-34. A vaccine is available against hepatitis B which is approximately 90% effective in the general population. An unimmunized individual who is exposed to hepatitis contaminated blood may be treated with hepatitis B immune globulin, which, if properly administered
within forty-eight hours, will prevent infection in 75% of the cases. Id.
238. Id at 933. The evidence presented at trial was not specific about the long term effects of
hepatitis. Woodhaven's medical expert testified that twenty-five percent of all those infected with
hepatitis become chronic carriers and that a certain percentage of those individuals ultimately die of
liver cancer. Id at 933 n.3. The court noted that the evidence presented in Glover v. Eastern
Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F.Supp. 243, 247 (D. Neb. 1988) indicated that five
percent of those infected with the virus do not recover fully. Ten to twenty-percent of these people
die immediately, while the other eighty to ninety percent suffer slow, gradual liver damage with
death occurring five to twenty-five years later from cirrhosis. Kohl, 865 F.2d at 933 n.3.
239. Kohl, 865 F.2d at 941-42.
240. Id. at 941. Applying 0Arline's four part factual inquiry, the majority found that the duration of carrier status, like the level of infectiousness, varied; the severity of the risk was grave because
ten percent of those infected require hospitalization and less than one percent die; dind the
probability that the disease would be transmitted and cause varying degrees of harm was high. The
court also concluded that given Kohl's unpredictable and violent behavior, it was inevitable that
unimmunized staff would be exposed to a significant risk. The majority held that the risk was significant because:
We cannot consider a 10-15 percent chance of infection so small as to be insignificant.
This is particularly true since the immune globulin post-exposure treatment is only 75%
effective under the best circumstances. Protecting 3 out of 4 unimmunized staff members is not equivalent to eliminat[ing] any significant risk .... This risk is unacceptable.
Id.
241. Id at 942 n.1. According to the dissent, because the chance of infection was 10-15% and
there was a 75% success rate for post-exposure treatment, the actual chance of transmission was
only 2.5% and the chance of developing a severe form of hepatitis was even smaller. Id.
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nificant risk. What makes a 25% chance of developing hepatitis a remote
or significant risk? What makes a 2.5% chance of transmission and
death remote or significant? What makes a .125% risk of death remote
or significant? What level of risk do the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA tolerate?
C.

The Need for Comparative Judgments

The determination of significant risk requires a court to balance the
disabled individual's interest in working and participating in society
against the need to protect society from contagious diseases. Raw figures
and percentages are not particularly helpful in striking this balance. To
one person a 2.5% risk sounds appreciable and significant, while to another it sounds only remote and insignificant. Raw numbers provide no
benchmarks for drawing reasoned distinctions; reasonable people can
reach diametrically opposed conclusions. Under such circumstances,
whether the Act protects the individual with a disabling contagious disease turns entirely on the predilections, and possibly the prejudices and
stereotypes, of the fact-finder, precisely what the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA prohibit.
Significant risk can be identified only in context and then only in
comparison with other risks posed by the workplace, program or situation. Other risks posed by the setting establish risk baselines. If risks of
comparable magnitude are tolerated in a particular setting, then the risk
posed by a person with a contagious disease cannot be considered significant. A comparative risk analysis recognizes that employers make no
real attempt to eliminate all possible safety risks. We simply do not and
cannot live or work in a risk free world. Rather, our goal is to eliminate
those risks that pose a significant or substantial threat to health and
safety. In a particular situation we can identify when risks are deemed
significant and thus unacceptable by identifying the nature and quantum
of other risks that are tolerated as acceptable in that context.
Courts have articulated and applied a comparative risk analysis.
Three members of the Supreme Court endorsed such an analysis in assessing safety concerns under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).24 2 The Third Circuit has adopted it in determining significant risk under the Rehabilitation Act.24 3
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act's significant risk standard is con242.

International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1211-14 (1991) (White, J.,

concurring).
243.

Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
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sistent with safety standards developed under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Under Title VII and the ADEA the
safety of third persons may give rise to a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) justifying job criteria based upon religion, sex, national origin or age when the safety concern is reasonably necessary to the essence
of the business.'
The greater the safety concern, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm, the more stringent
may be the job qualifications designed to insure safety.24 5 However, the
safety concern must be a substantial one. 2'
Title VII and the ADEA's safety BFOQ, like the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADEA, do not guarantee the highest degree of safety.2 47 Under
Title VII and the ADEA an employer cannot justify an employment criterion by merely demonstrating a minimal increase in risk of harm, i.e.,
that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more
person than might otherwise occur under the existing hiring practice. 248
A comparative risk analysis was utilized by three Supreme Court
Justices in InternationalUnion, UAW v Johnson Controls.2 49 There, the
Supreme Court considered a Title VII challenge to Johnson Controls'
policy which barred all women, except those whose infertility was medically documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure
exceeding Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards.25 °
Johnson Controls sought to justify the policy as necessary to protect fetuses from harm. 251 The issue was whether the fetal protection policy
qualified as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably
necessary to protect the safety of third parties.25 2 The Court unani244. Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 335 (1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
245. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413 (ADEA); Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. at 1213 (Title VII). If

safety interests are reasonably necessary to the overriding interest in public safety the employer must
also establish that he is compelled to rely on a protected criterion-age, race, sex, national origin or
race-as a proxy for the safety-related qualification. The employer may do this by establishing
either: (1) that all or substantially all those in the protected class "would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties of the job," or (2) that it "would be 'impossible or highly impractical' to
deal with the older employees on an individualized basis." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 (quoting
Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235).
246. Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct at 1213.
247. Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 234 (rejecting such a holding in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974)).

248. Id.
249. 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
250. Id. at 1205.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1204.
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mously concluded that the fetal protection policy did not qualify as a
BFOQ.2 53 A six justice majority held that fetuses did not qualify as third
"reasonably necessary" to the "normal operaparties whose safety was
25 4
tion" of the business.
However, three concurring justices-White, Kennedy and Rehnquist-reached their conclusion by applying a comparative risk analysis."' Justice White,writing for the three, concluded that the safety of
fetuses did qualify as a safety concern entitled to BFOQ protection, but
found that the level of risk to fetuses was too insubstantial to justify exclusion of all fertile women from jobs involving potential exposure to
high levels of lead.256 Justice White evaluated both the likelihood of fetal
exposure and the extent of the harm if exposure did occur. He then articulated and applied a comparative risk analysis to determine if the risk
was substantial: if the fetal protection policy insisted on a risk-avoidance
level substantially higher than other risk levels tolerated by the employer,
such as risks to employees and consumers, the policy could not be justified as a safety BFOQ. 257 White also noted that other alternatives existed
which could reduce the risk to fetuses to comparable levels, thus eliminating any substantial risk.258 This portion of his analysis parallels the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act's search for a reasonable
accommodation.
In Strathiev. Departmentof Transp. 259 the Third Circuit also used a
comparative risk approach to assess significant risk under the Rehabilitation Act. Strathie involved a hearing impaired applicant for the position
of school bus driver. The driver challenged a state licensing requirement
that excluded all hearing aid wearers from that job because they posed
"potential safety risks." 2 ° Recognizing that persons with corrected
hearing posed some risk, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless determined that
the risk was "too remote" under Section 504.261 The court determined
253. Id. at 1205.
254. Id.
255. Id at 1215.
256. Id These three justices found that avoidance of "substantial safety risks" to third parties is
"inherently" part of an employee's ability to perform a job and an employer's "normal operation" of
its business. Id
257. Id
258. Id at 1215 n.10 ("It is possible, for example, that alternatives to exclusion of women, such
as warnings combined with frequent blood testings, would sufficiently minimize the risk such that it
would be comparable to other risks tolerated by Johnson Controls.").
259. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
260. Id. at 232.
261. Id
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the significance of the risk by comparing it with the risks posed by drivers who wore eyeglasses and found the risks to be similar. Since the Department of Transportation did not exclude people who wore eyeglasses
from the position of school bus driver, the court determined that the
risks posed by drivers who wore hearing aids could not be deemed
appreciable.26 2
Significantly, the Department of Transportation argued in Strathie
that it needed to exclude hearing aid wearers from the job of bus driver
to insure the highest level of safety and eliminate as many potential safety
risks as possible.2 63 While these goals are laudable, they are not realistic.
As the court noted, the Department, in fact, did not try to eliminate all
risks, but only those it deemed "appreciable."12 6 4 A comparative risk
analysis provided the context for distinguishing between remote and appreciable or significant risks.
A comparative risk analysis provides a benchmark for a reasoned
assessment of the risk posed by those with contagious diseases. The disability discrimination statutes were designed to outlaw prejudice against
and irrational fear of those with disabilities. 26 A comparative risk analysis flushes out prejudices and stereotypes. By identifying and comparing the level of risk of transmission posed by a person with a contagious
disease with other risks arising in the same setting we can identify irrational fears-those that are out of proportion given the context in which
they arise.

IV. A COMPARATIVE RISK APPROACH TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS
wrrH AIDS
This comparative risk assessment is especially helpful in determining whether HIV infected health care workers present a significant risk to
others. Health care workers present a more difficult case for analyzing
significant risk than do school children and teachers. Not only does
there exist a theoretical risk of exposure to an infected worker's blood
during some medical procedures, but worker-to-patient HIV transmission may have actually occurred in Dr. Acer's dental office. Moreover,
the stories of possible AIDS transmission from Dr. Acer to five of his
262. Id Strathiewas decided prior to Arline, and the standard the court in Strathieapplied was
whether an "appreciable" risk existed. The court's "appreciable" risk standard appears to be synonymous with Arline's "significant" risk standard. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
263. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 232.
264. Id at 232-33.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
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patients have generated a wave of fear.2 s HIV, the disease of undesirables, has stricken "innocent" victims. Public reaction has been
fierce. 267 The cry for protection and exclusion is loud: a majority of
Americans believe that infected physicians and dentists should not be
allowed to practice.2 68
A comparative risk approach under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act would assist courts to push aside the fear and replace it with facts. If
courts are to avoid the lure of fear and prejudice to which we are all
subject, they must be meticulous in gathering and quantifying the medical information, and in applying Arline's four-part factual inquiry
through a comparable risk analysis. The remainder of this section sets
out the general guidelines for applying comparative risk analysis, then
compares HIV risk to hepatitis, its closest surrogate. It then examines a
case involving an HIV positive nurse to show the problems that occur
when courts fail to use a comparative risk analysis.
A.

The General Parametersof Comparative Risk

Under a comparative risk approach to determining whether a health
care worker infected with HIV presents a significant risk to patients, the
court must conduct an individualized determination of the worker's job
duties, job performance and infection control record.2 6 9 It must quantify
these factors and compare them to other patient risks tolerated in the
health care setting. If the risk posed by an HIV infected health care
worker is equal to or less than other risks normally tolerated, then the
worker does not pose a significant risk.
The court must first inventory the specific worker's job duties and
determine the relative level of risk posed. The five-level classification system set forth in Part I provides one method for classifying and identifying the relative risk. Non-invasive procedures-which include touching
and talking procedures, open wound and mucous membrane contact, and
minor cutting-involve no real risk of HIV transmission. Invasive procedures, including most surgeries, present some, although possibly negligible, risks. Exposure-prone procedures---those which require the
worker to operate inside a body cavity where vision is obstructed or maneuverability is limited-present the greatest risk to patients. While
these classifications help in assessing relative risks, studies presently un266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra notes 3-4.
See supra notes 3-8.
See Kantrowitz, supra note 3, at 51-54.
See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
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derway should allow public health officials to assess more accurately procedure-specific patient risks. 270
For example, surgeons, nurses and anesthesiologists all participate
in gynecological surgery; however, their duties differ. The surgeon may
perform an exposure-prone procedure when she uses a sharp instrument
to cut in a tight, visually obstructed body cavity. The anesthesiologist
performs only a touch and talk procedure to administer the anesthesia.
The nurse's duties may be a touch and talk procedure or may be exposure-prone, depending upon whether she merely passes instruments to
the surgeon or assists with them inside the patient.
Once the court classifies the worker's job duties, it must evaluate the
individual worker's job performance. The court may not rely upon generalized guidelines about the degree of risk posed by various types of
procedures.2 7 1 This is the fatal flaw in the CDC's July 1991 Recommendations. They suggest that HIV infected workers who perform exposureprone procedures, and only those workers, be subjected to review by an
expert review panel to decide which, if any, exposure-prone procedures
they may perform.2 72 However, a worker who cuts herself frequently
while performing invasive procedures creates a greater risk to patients
than the careful worker who performs exposure prone procedures without suffering cuts.
In evaluating the individual worker's job performance the court
needs to ask: What is the worker's cut and needlestick record? Does the
worker have a history of recontacting patients after a puncture? Courts
cannot merely rely upon studies of puncture wounds or recontact injuries. Such studies provide only average risk rates. The best evidence to
determine the actual risk posed by a specific worker comes from evaluating the specific individual's work record. Workers who are less skilled or
simply sloppy clearly pose a greater risk to patients than the average
practitioner; similarly, the exceptionally skilled or exceptionally careful
surgeon poses less risk.
The court should also inquire into the worker's compliance with
universal barrier precautions and standard infection control procedures.
If the worker has a history of failing to use barrier precautions or failing
to sterilize and disinfect instruments, she poses an increased risk to pa270. See 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 2-5; see also CDC OPEN MEETING, supra
note 1, at 49-55.
271. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 97-101.
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tients. This inquiry, too, requires an individualized finding based upon
the worker's specific work history.
Only after making these factual findings can a court attempt to
quantify the risk an HIV infected worker poses. In making this determination, the court should remember that the goal of the disability discrimination statutes is not to try to remove all potential risks.27 3 Even if a
worker presents some risk, the risk is significant only if comparable risks
are not tolerated. If the risk posed by a health care worker rises no
higher than other risks that are deemed acceptable as part of delivering
medical care, then the worker does not pose a significant risk to patients.
The fact that a worker poses a significant risk of transmitting the
HIV virus to a patient does not complete the inquiry. The next step
requires the courts to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
can reduce the risk to an acceptable level-a level that makes it comparable with other risks.2 74 Recall that an accommodation is not reasonable
if it imposes "undue financial and administrative burdens" or requires a
"fundamental alteration in the nature of the program."27 5 However, reasonable accommodation in the context of health care workers with HIV
may, depending on the individual circumstances, demand nothing more
than a double-gloving requirement or a proscription on performing only
those procedures that create the most risk. If significant risk exists because of the worker's past lapses in infection control, reasonable accommodation may require that the worker be given a chance to prove his
ability to comply fully with universal precautions and other requirements
while under close supervision.
For example, in Doe v Cook County Hosp. 276 the parties agreed in a
consent decree to allow an HIV infected neurologist to conth-ue practicing as long as he followed risk reduction procedures.2 7 7 The doctor
agreed to special surveillance, to double glove before performing invasive
procedures, and to forego performing three procedures-muscle biopsy,
sural nerve biopsy and cerebral arteriography.27
To determine if the risk posed by an HIV infected health care
worker is similar in magnitude to other risks that are tolerated in the
health care setting, courts should identify and quantify the risks posed by
273. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
274. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89.
275. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II,22-26 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303-04, 308.
276. No. 87-C-6888, (N.D. Ill., Consent Decree filed February 21, 1988).
277. Id
278. Id
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health care delivery. No hospital or health care provider, any more than
any other employer, tries to eliminate every potential risk. No hospital
can eliminate all risks because medical treatment is not risk free. Obtaining medical treatment always entails risk. These risks arise from a
myriad of causes: some workers are simply not as skilled as others; some
workers create heightened risks because of their mental or physical
states; medical treatment carries a risk of injurious side effects; and workers make mistakes-some amounting to malpractice, others simply being
unavoidable.
All workers present some risk to patients-such risk is part of being
human. Health care providers are human and human beings are imperfect. We all have foibles and weaknesses; we all make mistakes. Human
mistake is a normal and accepted, although unfortunate, risk of medical
treatment. However, certain workers present a known, increased risk to
patients-those who abuse drugs or alcohol, those who have just completed their training, those who have been found liable for malpractice,
and, yes, those who are HIV infected.
Ironically, only with HIV infection is there a demand for a complete
ban on professional practice.2 79 This inconsistency is inexplicable in light
of the fact that the risk posed by HIV infected workers is certainly no
greater than the risks posed by other workers in increased risk categories.
Residents who have less training and experience, substance abusing
workers, doctors adjudicated liable for malpractice, and workers who are
experiencing some emotional trauma all present an increased risk and
may be more likely to commit an error. 280 By contrast, the increased risk
posed by a hypothetical, average HIV infected surgeon is a mere one in
83,000.2"1 Certainly no more, and possibly much less than the risk posed
by other types of workers.
279. See Barnes, supra note 72.
280. Not only do certain workers present increased risks, but merely obtaining medical care
carries risks. Patients die daily from injuries caused by medical intervention rather than the underlying disease. While some of these injuries are the result of physician malpractice however, are iatrogenic-the result of medical treatment that meets the prevailing standard of care. The most
recent large scale study showed that .2% of all hospitalized patients died as result of iatrogenic
injury, while the risk of dying from malpractice while hospitalized was 0.009%. Troyan A. Brennan
et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients,324 NEw ENO. J. MED.
370, 373 (1991). In contrast, the risk to a patient from an HIV infected surgeon is much less-only
one in 83,000 or .0012%.
281. See supra note 1, at 54-4.
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B. HIV and Hepatitis
The risks to patients posed by HIV infected workers can be compared to the risks posed by workers with hepatitis. The hepatitis virus,
like the AIDS virus, is transmitted by blood.2 2 A patient's risk of contracting and dying of hepatitis after a needlestick with hepatitis infected
blood ranges from .072% to .66%.23 A patient's risk of contracting and
dying of AIDS after a needlestick with HIV infected blood is similar less
than .3%.2 14 Since HIV infected workers present the same, or even less
risk, than workers actively carrying hepatitis, they should be treated
comparably. Workers actively carrying hepatitis have not been routinely
2 6
25
excluded from practice; they are deemed to present a tolerable risk. 1
Likewise, we should not consider similarly situated HIV infected workers to be a significant risk to others.
The hepatitis virus is much more easily transmitted via blood than is
the HIV virus. While the HIV virus has an infection rate of less than
.3% after a worker cut or needlestick injury,28 7 the risk of hepatitis transmission after such an injury ranges from 6% to 30%. 2 "8 However, while
it is easier to contract hepatitis than HIV, hepatitis is not as likely to be
fatal as is HIV. Only 1.9% to 2.2% of those infected with hepatitis die
from the disease, either immediately from acute fulminate hepatitis or
from chronic liver disease. 2 9 Thus, a patient's risk of contracting and
dying of AIDS after a needlestick with HIV infected blood is less than
.3%,290 while a patient's risk of contracting and dying of hepatitis after
282. 1989 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 5-6.
283. Id. at 5-7.
284. See supra note 1, at 53-4.
285. See 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 2-3, 6.
286. Id

287. See supra note 56.
288. 1989 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 5; Department of Labor and Department of
Health and Human Services, Protection Against Occupational Exposure to Hepatitis B Virus and
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818 (Oct. 30, 1987).
The rate of infectivity depends upon whether the carrier's blood contains the hepatitis B e antigen
(HBeAg). This antigen is associated with higher levels of circulating hepatitis virus; therefore, persons with the antigen have a greater infectivity rate, approximately 30%. 1991 Recommendations,
supra note 53, at 3.
The hepatitis virus has been studied for a much longer time than has HIV. More information is
available about hepatitis transmission in the health care setting, the numbers of infected workers, the
chance of transmission of hepatitis, and the effectiveness of barrier precautions.
289. See 1989 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 5-7.
290. This figure assumes that all persons infected with the HIV virus will die, a fact that has yet
to be established as a medical certainty.
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being stuck with infected blood ranges from .072% to .66%.291
Further, a patient's chance of coming into contact with a hepatitis
infected health care worker is greater than the chance of encountering an
HIV infected worker. Less than 1% of health care workers are HIV
infected.2 92 However, ten to thirty percent of all health care and dental
workers have been or are infected with hepatitis, and six to ten percent
are active carriers capable of infecting others.2 93
Most telling, however, is that hepatitis has killed more patients than
has AIDS. Since the early 1970's there have been over 300 reported
cases of transmission of hepatitis from a health care worker to a patient.2 94 Researchers estimate that three of these patients died immediately from acute hepatitis while another three to six will die from chronic
hepatitis.2 95 By contrast, in the ten years of the AIDS epidemic, no case
of AIDS transmission from a hospital worker to a patient has been reported. Nearly 5,000 patients known to have been operated on by HIV
291. See 1987 Recommendations, supra note 43, at 5-6.
292. See supra note 24.
293. 1989 Recommendations,supra note 53, at 5-6. Health care workers are at special risk from
hepatitis. Twelve thousand health care workers performing jobs that involve exposure to patients'
blood become infected with hepatitis each year. Approximately two hundred and fifty health care
workers die each year from occupationally contracted hepatitis and 700-1200 become active Hepatitus B Virus carriers. 1989 Recommendations, supra, at 5. Although infection among health care
workers is common, hepatitis B is likely to decline as an infection control problem because a vaccine
against hepatitis B infection is now available and is recommended for many categories of health care
workers. See 1991 Recommendations, supranote 53, at z, and 1989 Recommendations, supra, at 12.
294. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 2-3; ProtectionAgainst ViralHepatitis, 39 MoRBIDTY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. Supp 2, at 14-16 (Feb. 9, 1990). The reports of hepatitis
transmission establish the efficacy of barrier precautions. Although cases of hepatitis transmission
from worker to patient have been reported for twenty years, no cases have been reported since the
advent of universal barrier precautions in 1986. See 1991 Recommendations, supra, at 3.
The reported cases of hepatitis transmission from worker to patient occurred in clusters involving
twenty health care workers. Each of these workers presented an increased risk of transmission and
all cases occurred prior to the 1986 recommendations for universal barrier precautions. Seventeen of
the twenty health care workers involved carried the hepatitis B e antigen increasing their infectivity,
while the antigen status of the other three workers is not known. Id. at 3. All the workers engaged
in practices that created a risk of blood to blood transmission. Twelve of the workers did not routinely wear gloves and several worked while suffering from skin lesions. Id. at 2. The other eight
workers-five obstetricians or gynecologists, and three cardiovascular surgeons-used gloves, the
potential existed for transmission during invasive procedures because of needlesticks while manipulating needles without being able to see them during suturing. Id. Recent unpublished reports
strongly suggest three additional hepatitis transmissions from three surgeons to patients in 1989 and
1990 during colorectal, abdominal, and cardiothoracic surgery. Id at 3.
295. The risk of immediate death from acute hepatitis infection is 0.125% while the risk of
dying from chronic liver disease resulting from the hepatitis infection ranges from 1% to 2%. See
DRAFT, CENTERS FOR DisEASE CONTROL, Estimatesofthe Risk of Endemic Transmission of Hepa.
titis B Virus and Human Immunodeficiency Virus to Patientsby the Percutaneous Route During
Invasive Surgicaland Dental Procedures (Jan. 30, 1991) (on file with author).
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infected surgeons have been studied and these studies have not identified
a single case of AIDS transmission.29 6 The only transmissions are from
one dentist who seriously and repeatedly breached standard infection
control and barrier precautions.
Yet, unlike HIV disease, no one has suggested banning all health
care workers who are active hepatitis carriers.2 97 In fact, although a test
exists that can reliably identify all those who are active carriers of hepatitis, no state requires screening for hepatitis.2 98 Historically, hospitals
and other medical employers have restricted health care workers known
to be carrying hepatitis only after the worker has infected a patient.2 99 In
many cases hepatitis infected workers have continued to perform even
invasive procedures on the condition that they comply with double gloving procedures and forego certain exposure-prone procedures." °
The most recent CDC recommendations are the first official recommendations to place any work restrictions on health care workers with
hepatitis.3 01 The CDC recommends that hepatitis infected health care
workers continue to practice even highly invasive procedures as long as
they comply with universal barrier precautions and recommendations for
sterilization and disinfection.3 "2 The only work restrictions suggested are
on workers who are especially infectious because they carry the IBeAg
antigen and who engage in exposure-prone procedures. Even in those
cases the CDC does not recommend an outright prohibition on such
workers performing exposure-prone procedures; rather, the CDC recommends that the worker seek advice from an expert review panel to determine under what circumstances, if any, she may continue to perform
exposure-prone procedures.30 3
The calculation of acceptable levels of risk must be consistent. If we
exclude health care workers who are HIV positive, but fail to exclude
296. See text supra note 78.
297. See Barnes, supra note 72, at 328 n.102 (noting the lack of screening in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan and Ohio).
298. Id
299. Id
300. Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36 MoaBID=-Y & MORTALnTY WKLY. REP. 68 (1987); 1991 Recommendations,supra note 53, at 3. Seven of
the twenty health care workers who have been reported as transmitting hepatitis to their patients
were allowed to continue performing invasive procedures after agreeing to double glove and forego
certain high risk procedures. For five workers, no further transmission to patients was observed.
However, for one obstetrician/gynecologist and one oral surgeon, hepatitis was transmitted to patients after infection control techniques were modified. Id at 2.
301. See Barnes, supra note 72.
302. 1991 Recommendations, supra note 53, at 5.
303. Id.
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those who actively carry hepatitis, despite the fact that the risk of transmission and death from hepatitis is actually slightly greater than the risk
of death from HIV transmission, we are allowing our fear and irrational
prejudice about AIDS to dictate our responses rather than the actuality
and significance of the risk posed by the disease. A comparative risk
approach replaces prejudice with a factually based assessment which allows courts to be consistent in determining when risk becomes
4

significant.
C.

3

On the Need to CompareRisks

Leckelt v. HospitalDistrictNo. I,305 a case involving an HIV positive
nurse, presents a good vehicle for applying the comparative risk approach to health care workers who are HIV positive. It exemplifies the
difficulties that arise when courts fail to be fastidious in gathering and
quantifying medical data. It also shows the futility of attempting to determine whether some risk amounts to a significant risk without a comparable risk analysis.
Kevin Leckelt worked as a licensed practical nurse at Terrebonne
General Medical Center in Houma, Louisiana.o 6 When the hospital
learned that Leckelt's homosexual lover had died of AIDS, the hospital
demanded that Leckelt submit the results of an HIV antibody test as a
condition of continued employment.3" 7 When Leckelt refused, he was
fired.3 °8 Leckelt sued, claiming, among other theories, that he was dis304. A comparative risk approach also clarifies the relevant issue for significant risk, thereby
putting to rest the oft-repeated argument that one must treat HIV infected doctors and patients
similarly. One variant of this argument goes: The risk to workers from HIV infected patients is
much greater than the risk to patients from HIV infected workers. Therefore, if HIV infected health
care workers pose a significant risk to patients, then infected patients must pose a significant risk to
workers, justifying workers' refusals to treat infected patients. The other variant of the argument
turns the conclusion around: If patients do not pose a significant risk to workers, then workers do
not pose a significant risk to patients.
However, workers and patients are not comparably placed. Health care workers, by the nature of
their profession, accept certain risks. The level of risk and the nature of the risks are different from
those that patients accept and that society is willing to tolerate as part of the cost of medical treatment. For purposes of a comparative risk analysis, comparing risks to workers and risks to patients
is like comparing apples to oranges-the two are not comparable. The risks posed by HIV infected
patients to workers should be compared to others risks workers are exposed to on thejob. If the risk
is the same or less than other job-related risks, then the risk is not significant for purposes of Section
504 and the ADA.
305. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
306. Id. at 821-24.
307. Id.
308. I1
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charged in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 9 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that Terrebone General had not
violated the Rehabilitation Act.3 10 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that Leckelt was not discharged solely because he was
regarded as being HIV positive, but because he had violated the hospital
infection control policies on reporting infectious or communicable disease.31 1 It also affirmed the district court's factual finding that the hospital held a reasonable belief that Leckelt was not otherwise qualified to
work as a licensed practical nurse because he "would not allow defendants to conduct the inquiry necessary to protect patients, co-workers and
plaintiff himself from any possible risk he may pose because of his particular situation. 31 2
Kevin Leckelt worked as an LPN for eight years providing routine
patient care with occasional assignments to the intensive care unit, the
emergency room, or the surgical recovery room.3 13 His duties included
giving injections, changing dressings, performing non-cardiac catheter314
izations, administering enemas and starting intravenous tubes (IVs).
While he routinely wore gloves for sterile procedures, like catheterizations or changing dressings, when starting IMs or giving injections, he
washed his hands but did not wear rubber gloves unless he had a cut,
abrasion or an open wound on his hands.31 5
The Fifth Circuit cursorily applied Arline's four-part analysis,
stating:
Even though the probability that a health care worker will transmit HIV to
a patient may be extremely low and can be further minimized through the
use of universal precautions, there is no cure for HIV or AIDS
3 16 at this time,
and the potential harm of HIV infection is extremely high.
The Fifth Circuit, relying on the district court's findings of fact, rejected Leckelt's argument that he presented little or no risk of transmitting HIV to patients. Although the district court did not expressly find
that any of Leckelt's duties involved invasive procedures, it did find that
309. Id. at 831. Leckelt also alleged violations of the Louisiana Civil Rights for Handicapped
Persons Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2251-2256 (West 1991), and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment Id.
310. Id. at 826.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 827-30.
313. Id. at 821.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. I& at 829.
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some of Leckelt's duties-in particular, starting IVs, injecting medication, performing catheterizations, changing dressings, and administering
enemas-provided "potential opportunities" for HIV transmission to
patients.3 17
In reaching its conclusion, the Leckelt court did not identify the
manner in which these procedures created a risk of HIV transmission, or
attempt to quantify the magnitude of the risk or the degree to which the
risk could be reduced through barrier precautions. With no factual basis,
the court had no framework for assessing the degree of risk.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis falters because it failed to identify the
manner in which the HIV virus could be transmitted during Leckett's
duties and it failed to quantify the risk that transmission might occur.
The lack of factual basis makes it impossible to determine what benchmark the court used in determining that the risk of harm was significant.
The court failed to conduct an individualized determination of Leckelt's
job duties, job performance and infection control record. Neither did it
quantify these risks and compare them to other patients' risks to determine if the risk was significant.
The court failed to inventory Leckelt's job duties and determine the
relative level of risk they posed. Kevin Leckelt's duties only involved
non-invasive procedures.3 18 Some required open wound or mucous
membrane contact, like changing dressings and administering enemas,
while others required minor cutting, giving injections, starting intravenous tubes and inserting non-cardiac catheters.3 19 Changing dressings
and administering enemas present practically no risk to patients as long
as the worker wears gloves. 320 The same is true of giving injections and
starting IV tubes. 321 Although some risk exists that the worker will
puncture or cut himself with the needle, a torn glove or contaminated
needle can be disposed of and replaced immediately without any danger
of the worker's blood coming into contact with the patient's non-intact
skin or mucous membrane.
Neither did the court fully evaluate Leckelt's job performance or
compliance with barrier precautions and infection control procedures.
Rather, the court relied on the testimony of two witnesses, Gladys
Verbus and Dr. Eickhoff. Gladys Verbus testified that during 1984 Leck317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
See supra text accompanying note 314.
See supra text accompanying note 62-63.
Id.
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elt removed bandages around her surgical incision, manipulated her
wound, and reinserted an IV tube without wearing gloves, even though
he had a cut on his finger that was covered with a blood-soaked adhesive
towel.322 Although Verbus was under the effect of various medications
when she made these alleged observations and the district court found
that "the full extent of Verbus' testimony to be unlikely," it found that
Leckelt did not use gloves during Verbus' care and the Fifth Circuit upheld this finding of fact.32 3 Additionally, Dr. Eickhoff, one of Leckelt's
expert witnesses, testified that between five and ten percent of the time
health care workers in general do not use recommended barrier precautions.3 24 Apparently, Dr. Eickhoff's testimony did not specify how he
arrived at these figures, which workers he was referring to, or which procedures were studied.
In relying only on these two witnesses, the Leckelt court failed to
make the individualized factual determination required by the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. First, it erroneously relied on Dr. Eickhoff's industry wide figures rather than assessing the particularized risk Kevin
Leckett posed. Second, in examining Kevin Leckelt's own behavior in
using barrier precautions, the court failed to ascertain what present level
of risk Leckett posed. The court did not examine Leckett's current compliance with barrier precautions and the hospital's policies and procedures for ensuring compliance. Rather, the court placed an inappropriate
and inordinate emphasis on one alleged lapse during eight years of employment-a lapse which occurred before the threat of AIDS was understood and before the CDC had issued its guidelines suggesting barrier
precautions, and two years before the hospital fired Leckett.
No evidence was introduced that Leckelt presently failed to comply
with barrier precautions. In fact, evidence indicated that Leckelt was
careful to comply with the general infection control requirements prohibiting him from working when he had draining lesions. In December,
1984 and February, 1985 Leckelt notified the hospital that he was being
treated for syphilis and was placed on medical leave. At trial evidence
showed that Leckelt also received treatment for syphilis in March
1985.325 The record is unclear whether hospital infection control procedures required Leckelt to report this treatment.32 6
322. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 821 n.l.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 821 n.1, 829-30.
325. Id. at 823.
326. Id. at 823, 826. In December, 1984 and February, 1985, Leckelt notified the hospital he
was being treated for syphilis and the hospital placed him on medical leave. Leckelt also received
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Given the fact that Leckelt's duties all involved non-invasive procedures and that he apparently complied with barrier precautions and infection control procedures, Leckelt presented little, if any, risk to
patients. Certainly he presented much less that the one in 83,000 figure
cited for surgeons and substantially less risk than that posed by other
higher risk workers. Under a comparable risk approach Leckelt should
be treated like workers with hepatitis: he should be carefully monitored
and required to scrupulously comply with barrier precautions and infection control procedures.
A comparable risk approach, unlike the non-factually based decision
in Leckelt, acts as a check to assure that courts do not react out of fear or
prejudice, however unintentional, in their application of Section 504. A
comparable risk approach demands that the court identify and quantify
the level of risk and compare that risk with other risks to patients posed
in the health care setting. Only if the risk posed by an HIV infected
health care worker is equal to or greater than other risks normally tolerated in the health care setting can the HIV infected health care worker be
a significant risk for purposes of Section 504 and the Rehabilitation Act.
CONCLUSION

QUESTION: If you have a choice between two surgeons to operate on you,
one who is HIV positive and one who is HIV negative, which one should
you choose?
ANSWER: The better one.32 7
Certainly, all health care workers should heed the old adage: doctor
do no harm. However, if we expect doctors who are HIV positive to
remove themselves from practice, we also must demand the removal of
large numbers of doctors who pose an equal or greater risk: those with
hepatitus; those found liable in any malpractice proceeding; residents in
training; those going through the emotional trauma of a divorce or the
loss of a loved one, and those who are simply having a bad day.
We should not expect perfection from health care workers. We
should expect them to take all reasonable precautions to avoid injury to
their patients. Rather than focusing on the HIV status of doctors and
other workers, we would do better to police the use of universal barrier
precautions and other infection control procedures. The best way to intreatment for syphilis in March, 1985. Id at 823. The record is unclear on whether hospital infection control procedures required Leckelt to report this treatment.
327. Dr. Kenneth Ong, Department of Health of New York City, repeating an anecdote during
testimony given at, CDC OPN MEETING, supra note 1, at 145.
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sure that workers do no harm is to insure that they use precautions, regardless of HIV status. Workers who fail to use precautions, even
inadvertently, should be harshly punished and, when appropriate, removed from patient care.
We would also do better to improve the safety of all medical procedures by developing techniques, gloving methods and technologies that
reduce the opportunity for a worker to cut herself.3 21 Many procedures
create potential patient harm from cuts to workers followed by patient
recontact. The best protection is to reduce the opportunity for transmission by demanding that all health care workers comply with accepted
safety procedures.
The issue ultimately should not be which doctors are HIV positive.
We cannot answer this question. Current testing regimes simply cannot
identify all workers infected with HIV, even if we could afford routine
testing.3 29 Any health care worker, like any of us, is a possible source of
the virus. Rather, we should ask which doctors create unnecessary risks
for themselves and their patients by cutting themselves or by failing to
use universal barrier precautions. Only when the risk an individual
worker creates is greater than that which we routinely accept in the
health care delivery system should that worker, and that worker alone,
be excluded.

328. See Gary C. Burget et al., Letter to the Editor, 267 JAMA 803 (1992); see also Barnes,
supra note 72, at 324. See also Troyan Brennan, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus in the Health Care Setting - Time for Action, 324 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1505, 1506-07 (1991).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.

